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The One CA Podcast

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One CA Podcast is here to inspire anyone interested in traveling to work with a partner nation’s people and leadership to forward U.S. foreign policy. ​ We bri...

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  • 211: Christopher Meyer on PRC strategic corruption and political warfare (Part I)
    Today, Sam Cooper, founder of the news outlet The Bureau, guest hosts Christopher Meyer, a former U.S. official and China expert during the Bush One and Two Administrations. Meyer currently serves as the head of the U.S. Micronesia Council and founded Wide Fountain, a platform for in-depth geopolitical analysis.  In this the first of a two-part episode, Sam and Christopher discuss PRC strategic corruption and political warfare. So, let's get started.  Sam Cooper's The Bureau: https://www.thebureau.news/ Christopher Meyer's Wide Fountain platform: https://widefountain.substack.com/ --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association a and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to Cozy Ambience for a sample of "February Cafe Jazz - Instrumental Bossa Nova Music for Work, Study and Relax - Background Music" retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmq8Ht-sNwQ --- Transcript 00:00:01    Introduction Welcome to the One CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. One CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Today we welcome Sam Cooper, founder of the news outlet The Bureau, as he interviews Christopher Meyer, a former U.S. 00:00:44    SAM COOPER official and China expert during the Bush I and II administrations. Meyer currently serves as the head of the U.S. Micronesia Council and is the founder of Wide Fountain. a platform for in -depth geopolitical analysis. This is the first of a two -part episode. Sam and Christopher discuss PRC strategic corruption and political warfare. So let's get started. 00:01:07    SAM COOPER Today I'm excited to introduce Chris Myers. Chris is a longtime China expert and former U .S. government diplomatic and economic issues officer, and he explains how military intelligence and influence networks embedded deeply with organized crime are a central feature of the global strategy employed by the families that really are running communist China. And when I say that, we're going to discuss your research on the family of Xi Jinping, the Xi family, and you call it the Yezi clique. But first, tell our viewers your background in getting into China and your career. 00:01:46    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Thank you very much, Sam. I started a keen interest in China when I was 16. And I read the history of the opium wars and I was outraged. And I decided I wanted a career to be involved in business and diplomacy between the U .S. and China. And then as an undergrad student, I did research on the special economic zones. This was in the early 80s and the special economic zones were just announced. And my research led me to see the geopolitical aspects. There were some. across from Macau, across from Hong Kong, and across from Taiwan. So I sort of had an eye to that. And then I did business. I was, for five years, I was with a Fortune 500 company. And I had the opportunity to do some business in Xiaomon. And I saw some things that set off alarm bells in my mind. And I kind of filed that. And I had some experiences that informed my research later. I worked in the government in Bush 1 and Bush 2. I was involved in Indo -Pacific affairs. really helping American companies do business in the region, and then became a consultant to part of the government that administered our territories in the Pacific. So I saw some things there that, again, set off alarm bells in my mind. And in 2016, I happened to cross an old colleague who kind of gave me some more information. And basically from 2016 until 2022, I conducted a lot of independent research. I decided I wanted to know exactly what was going on because proxies in the region seemed emboldened to take on the U .S. And they didn't have a government portfolio, but they acted like they did. And so my research sort of started in Micronesia. I had the great opportunity to come across your book. You totally informed. parts of what I was looking at and kind of put the spotlight on what happened in Canada. And I kind of worked the two sides to the middle and conducted most recently research that kind of takes us from Mao Zedong's death until the 90s. And I believe that there was a click. I call it the yes, she click. There were scores to settle. There were powerful families that were on the cusp of greatness or recognition for all their good work, and they were purged. And it led some individuals to become extremely militant in their conduct of political warfare against the U .S. So that sort of sets the table for what we might be talking about. 00:04:28    SAM COOPER Yeah. So to get into this, let's start with the Ye family. They're mysterious, but for experts, they're very clearly a clan that has tremendous kingmaking power in China. So maybe let's start with who they are and then bridge into how they connect with Xi's father. 00:04:46    CHRISTOPHER MEYER So the patriarch, Lie Jianying, was literally the kingmaker of Mao Zedong. He came from Guangdong province, and he was involved in the very earliest movements of the Communist Party in China. And he fled one of those, I think it was the Guangzhou uprising, with Zhou Enlai, and they escaped to Hong Kong. So Ye Jianying is one of the original revolutionaries in China, and he had the title of Marshal Ye. And when he crossed paths with Mao Zedong, he was actually the aide -de -camp to a very powerful Communist Party operator out of Beijing who had an army of tens of thousands. And he rolled up to Mao and his very small group of long marchers and said, follow us, we're going to Sichuan province. And Mao was like, no, I don't think that's a safe bet. The locals are going to tear you up. And Ye Jianying kind of heard a truth in Mao and he deserted this powerful general and with him brought the code books. So Mao gets Ye Jianying and the code books and he's able to communicate with the Comintern. And lo and behold, that general did get wiped out in Sichuan. He returned to Mao's base. With a few thousand troops from then, Mao became the most powerful leader in the communist ecosystem. So Ye Jianying had a very high regard for Mao. Mao called him the savior of the Communist Party and the Communist Revolution. And so fast forward it right through the revolution. Ye gets a very top position as the party secretary for Guangdong province, the largest and economically most powerful province in the country. And Mao wants to conduct his land reform in Guangdong, just as he does everywhere. And it's a violent thing where landowners are hunted down and put to death. Yeah, because he was a native Cantonese, understood that the landowners in Guangdong were not of the same ilk as those throughout China. They actually worked the lands. They had a very cooperative relationship with labor. And he tried to resist. But Mao forced Lin Biao into Guangdong. And Ye lost his government role. And if he hadn't been in the military, he would have been completely out of power. But because he had a military portfolio, he was able to stay on the peripheries. And he was actually part of the small group that brought down the Gang of Four and ended the Cultural Revolution. So Ye Jianying went through the Mao Zedong grinder, but he did it so early in the 50s that he was able to... maintain power and have it going forward. Another Long March hero was Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhong Chun. And his claim to fame in the Communist Party was he maintained security over the area where Mao was camped in Yan 'an. And he was able to provide Mao and his group with enough security that they could camp there through a winter and survive. Not only that, but he negotiated and he conducted diplomacy with the tribesmen in the Northwest, in Qinghai, in Xinjiang, and in Tibet. And he was loved. And he got a lot of rebels and insurgents among these minority populations to join the Communist Party. And Mao gave him great profs for that and referred to him as one of the heroes of the Three Kingdoms period. brilliant statesman who was able to ingratiate with the minorities and make them part of the Chinese nation. Unfortunately, though, Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongchun, he was purged, but he was purged later. He was purged in 1962. And from Xi Jinping's age nine until he was 25, Xi Jinping's father was under arrest. Without trial, it was just the culture revolution. He was under arrest because his office published a book that was deemed not flattering to Mao Zedong. Basically, he was promoting some thought within the Communist Party that Mao didn't like. So Xi's father is in jail from 62 to 78. And because Ye Senior and Xi Zhongchun had a relationship, Ye Jianying kind of became a godfather of sorts for Xi Jinping. Xi was sent to work in the countryside and he escaped and he tried to get back to Beijing and it wasn't safe for him to be reunited with his family. And Ye intervened. And Ye made sure that Xi joined the Communist Party, even though these tragedies were all around him, and made sure that he got the semblance of an education, although he really never did. He was a guide for Xi Jinping throughout his younger years. in place of his father. 00:10:02    Sam Cooper Before we continue how those families dovetail together, can you describe in China's political economy, what is the power of Marshal Ye? 00:10:13    CHRISTOPHER MEYER So in the 50s, he was jettisoned out of the political arena. His main work was in the PLA. He was a marshal and he became minister of defense in China. And he was responsible for procurement. And to sort of give you a sense, when the Korean War started, the United Nations put a blockade on trade with China because they were arming the North Korean army. Marshal Yeh was responsible for making sure that supplies got to North Korea. And that was a big role that he fulfilled. And his sons kind of brought that along. So it's curious because Marshal Yeh was one of the most powerful stars in the communist lineup, but he was also a minority. He was from Guangdong and he was a Haka Chinese. So some people would say that Haka Chinese within China, there's a lid sometimes on their ability to move up. And so perhaps he was never considered for the echelon, but he did arise very high. But in some ways, and his sons adopted this even more so, they had to become very combative. in their political dealings. But no doubt about it, Marshal Yeh had a chance to handle huge volumes of military supplies, and there was an opportunity to skim and generate great wealth, which probably was the case. The way that Marshal Yeh fulfilled the supply chains for the North Korean army was through organized crime. And it just happened that two of The individuals, Henry Falk and Stanley Ho, were also Hakka Chinese. And they became the kingpins of organized crime in Hong Kong and Macau. Both of them are on record as saying they made their fortunes supplying the Korean War. 00:12:15    SAM COOPER Right. So people that read my book are very familiar with Stanley Ho, according to U .S. government intelligence. the absolute king of Chinese international mafia with connectivity to casinos, banking, political influence operations in Canada, triad leadership in Canada. So I think we've set the table for the 90s in Guangdong, Fujian. Xi Jinping is now starting to come on the scene politically there. The Ye family, who were partners essentially of Xi's father. had a little bit of a godfather eye on Xi's movements within the party. We can say that they're the power behind a throne that they want to see continue to rise. So can you take us into the 90s, the sort of Stanley Ho connectivity to Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and how that combines the Hong Kong tycoons slash triad leaders with the communist powers in Fujian? 00:13:21    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Yes. Mao passed away in 78. Deng Xiaoping came to power. And Deng was all about economic reform and catching up to the West. So in southern China, Fujian and Guangdong province, Deng looked to Ye Jenying and his sons. His sons were in their 30s now. And he also looked to Xi Zhongshan. Xi Zhongshan became party secretary for Guangdong province. in the early 80s. And Deng kind of put together this group. The Ye's and the Xi's were family friends. They celebrated Chinese holidays together. The Xi's were northern Chinese, but they kind of encamped in Guangdong province after a certain amount of time. And that's where Xi's father retired. But in Guangdong, the son of Ye, his name was Ye Xuanping. Basically, he was mayor of Guangzhou and the governor of Guangdong. And very quickly, he was referred to as the emperor of the south. So in the 80s, he was running Guangdong province. And he became so powerful that the CCP sought to have him step down. And he actually threatened to withhold tax to Beijing from the province of Guangdong unless they negotiated with him. He wanted a vice chair of the CPPCC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee. And he wants to be a vice governor of the CPPCC. And he wanted to be allowed to maintain his power base in Guangdong. And this is a rare case where the CCP actually deferred to these wishes. Just to get him out of running the most powerful province in China, they said okay. So he goes over the CPPCC. And he takes with him the kingpins of organized crime in Hong Kong and Macau. Stanley Ho never had a position, but Henry Falk and the other top lieutenants in these organized crime entities all wound up on the CPPCC. And to give you a sense of like, what was some of the magic Stanley Ho had when he won the monopoly on gaming in Macau? He devised this VIP room concept where... He owned the casino, but the VIP rooms were run by basically triads and junkets, powerful friends from mainland China and triads. And the triads conducted all kinds of crime that the Vancouver model got in a very big dose. So it was racketeering and prostitution and all kinds of things, but also collections. So Stanley Ho didn't have to work on collections because his muscle did it for him. But the strongest of these triad operators wound up in the CPPCC, as long as they were effective in what they were doing for the government. And 14K is dominated by Hakka Chinese. Most of the most powerful triads have a very strong Hakka element to it. And I don't mean to suggest that this wonderful race of Chinese called Hakkas is all bad. Lee Kuan Yew, the premier of Singapore, was Hakka Chinese. phenomenal Chinese, but there were also some very nefarious and very effective in their criminal activities that were Haka Chinese. So the Ye's were in the middle of this. And Chinese language social media accounts in Hong Kong will talk about the Ye's dominance over these gaming operators in Macau. 00:17:07    SAM COOPER Let's get into that and explore that more. I just want to ask a side question. As I'm aware of a very important figure, in what we call the Hoag Commission in Canada. I'm just going to leave it at that. This is our inquiry into foreign interference that stemmed from my investigative reporting. And there is a politician at the center of that that my sources close to them said went off to a haka conference in China for weeks or something like that, you know, while being an elected politician in Canada. Knowing what you know, and I'm just coming out of the blue with this question, is there anything good for Canada that they could be doing on that trip? 00:17:45    CHRISTOPHER MEYER There could be a lot of normal cultural activity, but I'll say one thing, that the powers that are doing the kinds of things that I'm concerned with are definitely represented in those groups. There might be a wink and a nod and things look very normal on the surface, but there's no free lunch in China. Everybody has to pay the piper, and the piper is the communist party of China. 00:18:11    SAM COOPER So let me ask you this. Viewers of the Bureau know that I've pressed away in journalism in explaining that the United Front Work Department and international money laundering and organized crime are synonymous. They're one and the same. The CIA says the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is really the core unit of the United Front. So what you're getting at... I think the Ye family, these power brokers that are behind Xi and his power in southern China, you're saying they essentially formed this United Front and organized crime compact as sort of a political tool, a smuggling tool, a military tool? 00:18:55    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Yes. And I want to say that the United Front was an early Communist Party creation. And the thing about the Communist Party... They infiltrated the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang had more power and they were the power base in China, the communists used political warfare to infiltrate them and really become their undoing. And the United Front is basically one way to get all parts of society under the control of the CCP. So within the United Front, the CPPCC is sort of the big leagues. And all the other organizations are the feeder groups. So if you get in a small united front group and you deliver in a big way, you can get promoted all the way to this PCC. And Ong Lapsung is an example of that. So the whole idea of the united front is to harness and control all the resources from academia, the private sector. from all aspects of society and to make them work for the Communist Party. And I feel that any united front operation, and there's so many in Canada and the U .S., they should just be called assets of the Chinese government. That's one way for the Chinese to increase their headcount of diplomatic officers within any given country. 00:20:26    Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes of One CA Podcast.   Episode 2 00:00:01    Introduction Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Today we welcome Sam Cooper, founder of the news outlet The Bureau, as he interviews Christopher Meyer, a former U .S. 00:00:44    Introduction official and China expert during the Bush 1 and 2 administrations. Meyer currently serves as the head of the U .S. Micronesia Council and is the founder of Wide Fountain. a platform for in -depth geopolitical analysis. This is the second of a two -part episode. Sam and Christopher discuss PRC strategic corruption and political warfare. So let's get started. 00:01:08    SAM COOPER I feel that any United Front operation, and there's so many in Canada and the U .S., they should just be called assets of the Chinese government. That's one way for the Chinese to increase their headcount of diplomatic officers within any given country. And they should be labeled that way and they should be treated that way. And they're conducting operations for China. So to get back to the Ye family, I just want to say very briefly, so Deng Xiaoping taps the older brother, Ye, and he's in the government and he has a nine, 10 -year run in Guangdong. The younger brother, his name is Ye Xuanning. He's the dangerous one. He's a real interesting cat. So, yeah. was in college during the Cultural Revolution. And just to give you an idea of the thin ice that you could be skating on in China, he graduated from college and he was thrown in jail. And he was thrown in jail because, you know, Mao wanted to send a signal to the Ye family, I'm in control here. You're not in control. He got out of jail and he had a job in a radio factory or something like that. And he must have been so distraught, he lost his arm in an accident. throwing boxes into a crusher and he lost his arm. So he became a calligrapher with his left hand. And if you know Chinese, like every time you write calligraphy, your hand is going across what you're writing. If you're left -handed, I don't know how he did it. I'm left -handed. And he became an accomplished calligrapher with his left hand. So it just gives you a sense of the spirit of this guy. He's not your normal. person. I think he was a genius. I think he was extremely hardworking. And one of his first positions, he was involved in a small United Front operation in Beijing. Then he became secretary for Kang Xian, who was sort of the head of the oil faction in China. And he was a very powerful individual. And then he found himself in Guangdong. And when his brother was appointed head of the province and the city of Guangzhou, He got into Espionade, and he became the spymaster for the PLA, working in the GDP. And he really had it. He sort of hit his stride there, and that's how he ended his career. The spymaster for the PLA. I think any other rival couldn't even hold a candle to him. He was totally gifted. And his brother and he were able to leverage all of their... contacts with organized crime because he used them in operations around the world. And I think he's the one who weaponized it to the point where, number one, organized crime figures were making money for the military, a lot of it. And number two, they were almost pre -trained in operations. They were bold. They would go anywhere and do anything. And Aung La Pseung is a good example of that. 00:04:11    CHRISTOPHER MEYER I was going to say, because not everyone knows these names like you and I do, but Enlap Sang, nominally a real estate developer from Macau. My Files, he's a huge international organized crime figure known for the so -called Clinton Gate or White House visits. He's the guy that got next to the Clinton White House or got inside, you know, maybe five to ten times. He ends up getting done, as they say, in a United Nations corruption case, which of course connects to a very important guy in Australia that successfully sued my colleague, John Garneau, and yet is at the top of Chinese organized crime funding Australian politics. He was involved in that FBI case. So to bring it back, what I've picked up in my book and in my repeated reporting efforts at the Bureau is these international Chinese businessmen in real estate and casinos, tech these days, they go around the world, they get next to our politicians, and that's their job. They're being tasked by whoever the Ye family spymaster of today is, is sending them abroad to do that. At some point, Xi Jinping comes into this and says it's okay. 00:05:30    SAM COOPER okay. And it's still evolving. I mean, I came on to this. When I read your book and I saw your story of Lai Changxin, I said, holy shit, I have to get into this. You see the level of danger that it brings to a country like Canada and North America. But I think that Ye Xuen Ning created the mechanism for the CCP to use and leverage organized crime to, 00:05:51    SAM COOPER mechanism for the CCP to use and leverage organized crime to, number one, fund military operations. and other things, and to extend influence operations. Like the United Front is all about influence operations. But if you introduce organized crime elements into parts of the United Front, you can weaponize it and you can get a lot more bang for your buck using these nefarious creatures that you're managing, you're controlling them. And I want to mention something. How does the CCP have control over organized crimes? So I want to say, In the late 90s, Macau No. 1 was about to be returned from Portuguese administration to Chinese. And 2, the kind of monopoly of the casinos license was coming up in 2002. And what happened was these triad operators were starting to push back against Stanley Ho. Stanley Ho's right -hand man was shot in the face in Victoria Park during this period. And the Portuguese sent an official to try to calm down the situation. And that individual was shot when he arrived. And the Communist Party kind of went in and took control. When the monopoly came up, Stanley Ho and his family, they got the coverage. But that's because he's completely loyal to the CCP. And so the CCP has so much leverage over these entities. Completely, he devised the strategy to integrate organized crime. And then he passed away in 2016. And then the institutional steps took place after that. They had to transfer from sort of a control of one man to the government running it. And you can see examples around 2016 of a lot of large -scale Chinese operations having disruption during this period. One of the reasons they were able to do this for so long was that Ye Xuanning was completely secretive. I mean, he managed these operations in a very keen and brilliant way, and he was never identified. Xi Jinping's role is interesting. Ye Xuanning told his brothers to help Xi Jinping. And you can kind of see like an increase in their efforts when Xi's father... He was in Beijing, and he had a very high role. He pulled a bureau standing committee, and he was sent down because of Tiananmen. He was on the reformer side, and he publicly admitted it. He was a very admirable individual, and he said he was supporting Hua Guofeng. So he faced early retirement in 1993, and the Ye brothers were so upset about this, and probably Xi too. They sort of doubled down on their efforts on behalf of this political warfare. It's almost as if they were pissed off at the Communist Party, but they took it out on North America. It's like they had to become more radical in what they were doing because in order to get power in China, you had to outflank Li Peng and the hardliners. So there's an interesting element there. 00:09:13    CHRISTOPHER MEYER You talk about this combination of military intelligence and organized crime. and political warfare and global influence operations. Trade is obviously involved. Explain what you mean by radicalization of that tool in operations. 00:09:31    SAM COOPER So there were about 10 operations in the 1990s that I believe were masterminded by the Yeshi Clay and primarily Yeshi Ning. The most outrageous, there was one and probably several. smuggling of military -grade machine guns into the U .S. from China. And one of the groups that was set up, helped finance the military, was the Poly Group. And the Poly Group, they were on the bill of lading for these. They were labeled as something else, but they came into the port of Oakland. And the interesting thing was the CEO of Poly Group, who was a princeling himself, was meeting in the White House and had his photo taken with President Clinton. At the time, these machine guns were on the water. That's bold. Yes. And when I ponder this, it's like I know how much the Chinese love photographs. That photo shown by Xi Jinping to all the cronies in Beijing would get him a lot of brownie points. And these machine guns were being distributed to gangs in the area. Street gangs in California. So this kind of thing, right? Right. And so that one was uncovered. But how many others slipped by? And there have been cases similar magnitude in Tennessee and Florida. 00:10:57    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Yeah, and this is where it gets into the leaked Sidewinder report that I touched on in the book. But yeah, that report refers to Pauley Group laundering 2 ,000 AK -47s into California. You're saying you believe that not only is Xi Jinping supported by this Ye family intelligence, who I have no problem believing are behind the United Front organized crime nexus. You're saying you think Xi Jinping is a mind involved in this kind of thing as well. 00:11:30    SAM COOPER Originally, as I was doing my research, I thought Xi was the mastermind. But as I did a deep dive to what his contemporaries said of him, The big knock on Xi was that he wasn't educated. Like age nine to age 25, his dad has been persecuted and locked up without trial. And he's forced to work in the countryside and he's not happy about it. I mean, he wasn't educated. And that's the biggest knock on Xi Jinping. And when you look at the history of Xi in Fujian, first of all, he goes to the Ministry of Defense and then doesn't do... anything of note there as a young man. But then he goes into Hebei province and he's working in Hebei province as a middle level provincial official. And he's not doing much. I mean, his big contribution was suggesting that they film a TV show in that province and kind of burned out. He wasn't favored by the Communist Party officials there. You know, he's brought to Fujian. Communist Party officials bounce around provinces and each time they have an increasing role. Well, he stays in Fujian for 17 years. And it's almost like he's being babysat by the Yehs. And I mean, the Yeh family compound was a two and a half hour drive from where she was in Fujian. And so I don't think he was the mastermind, but he was definitely the beneficiary. And I think that it was a long term project. And the Yeh brothers. put the pieces on the table to help promote Xi Jinping. And here's an interesting thing. In 1997, there was a big Central Party conclave, the 15th Central Party plenary meeting. And Ye wasn't even named as an alternate delegate. So you've got hundreds of delegates coming from all over the country. And he's a princeling. And he's been in provincial government for 12 years. And he's not even named. Somebody forced him onto the list of alternate delegates. There were 150. He was the 151st alternate delegate. He didn't receive one vote. He was pushed on. And I think somebody in the realm said, you know what? We're running all these operations and we're doing it so secretively. Nobody knows that this is for Xi Jinping. So they started gradually to kind of promote Xi as. the mastermind of this. And the years were okay with that. But Xi Jinping was on his way to becoming the leader of China by 2002. 00:14:08    CHRISTOPHER MEYER And I was over in Taiwan, invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over a year ago with international journalists. And we had kind of a dinner talk where their political intelligence expert was going to talk about some of this Klan details and things like that. And they said, yeah, within the princelings, Xi Jinping was the least likely, the least talented to reach chairman. 00:14:37    CHRISTOPHER MEYER And so, OK, you know, I'm not the expert. If someone from Taiwan is telling me that, you're saying that. So if true, and you're saying the power behind the throne is this Ye family that boosts him. And they're the ones you're saying that are the masterminds of what I'm going to call modern political Chinese communist warfare using proxies, organized crime, dirty tycoons. So this is where we're going. 00:15:06    SAM COOPER Yep, this is where we're going. And let me just touch on a few of the operations in the 1990s, just to give you a sense for what was going on and the fact that the Chinese were never completely called out on the carpet for it. Just let them continue doing it. And one of the themes of my research is it's time to call the Chinese out. And to do that, you have to be very specific. I think there needs to be a large group of countries that has their research done and they call out Xi Jinping for this political warfare that absolutely is hyper -destructive. 00:15:41    CHRISTOPHER MEYER So you're saying this is an intelligence operation? Yeah. For the last 10 minutes or so, In direct relationship to this network you're talking about, the 90s, 2000, aggressive combination of international organized crime, Hong Kong tycoons, Macau tycoons, in Chinese military influence operations, also people smuggling, also drug smuggling, illegal migration and, you know, fentanyl. There is a basis that Chinese triads and Mexican cartels are working together on those things and that Canada is a, you could call it, if this is a company, the controlling minds of a lot of this are in Vancouver and Toronto. Canadian ports are very deeply infiltrated by China, along with some Iranian mafia and intelligence. It's a fact. So where do we go from there? I myself, as a Canadian, the good countries of the world need to get together to combat this approaching, if not already into early stages of the access of China, Iran, Russia, North Korea. We're at loggerheads and they're using Canada, I believe, unfortunately. 00:17:01    SAM COOPER Right. And I do believe that Yeshua Ning is a genius and he looked at North America and he wants to inflict pain on the U .S. When he set up these plans in the early 90s, the Chinese GDP was a fraction of the U .S. So he had a lot of ground to make up. And he chose Vancouver because the resources to combat his efforts were probably deemed to be significantly less than the resources in the U .S. So I feel that the attack on Canada, the Vancouver model. if you will, which spread right across to Toronto and then down into Queens and across to LA and permeates everything. I believe that the US and Canada should try to get on the same page about this and to the extent possible, Mexico as well. And then the UK and Australia haven't been unaffected by this. There should be a big effort to get on the same page with the West because this is a totalitarian regime doing its level best to take us out. 00:18:07    CHRISTOPHER MEYER The controlling mind, I'm saying, of the Mexican cartels, I think it's Chinese triads. That's the real power there. 00:18:15    SAM COOPER I think we're both in agreement. If you want to draw a word picture that says what this is, picture that there's a really bad actor and he's throwing a really illegal party and selling drugs and he's bringing it all in. And the U .S. is going after the people who own the land where all of this took place. You have to go after China. And I believe that China is making 98 % of the precursors for fentanyl, and then they're laundering the money. That's the other piece. They're laundering it. They're operating this massive money laundering operation for the cartels. So I say the gloves do come off, but I would love to see them come off in unison. And all of these, at least in North America, Mexico, Canada, and the U .S., we're all on the same page. And we speak with one voice. And I'll add to this. Xi Jinping has been as painful towards his own population as he has been externally and internationally. So he's inflicted pain on the Chinese and he's about to go down. I mean, he's got his wings clipped in the last few months and he may not be in power very long. There's some serious movement in China. 00:19:30    CHRISTOPHER MEYER You sound like my friend Harry Tsang, the ambassador for Taiwan and Ottawa. He's bearish on Xi Jinping in a big way. 00:19:38    SAM COOPER Yeah. Well, I think it's a good time for the West to approach China and say, look, we got off on the wrong foot. Let's reboot. And by the way, there's some reparations needed here. 70 ,000 people have been dying a year from this, and it's a Chinese operation. You know, the cartels are definitely part of it, but... I think there's good reason for the West to get on the same page. 00:20:02    CHRISTOPHER MEYER Absolutely. So we will end it there for a first great chat. And I think next time we'll get into the juicy story of Lai Cheng Zing, the bigot China's supposed most wanted. Or what was he? So I'll leave it at that and we'll pick it up next time. You have to say, 00:20:21    SAM COOPER have to say, I'm sitting there doing my research. I get your book. And all of a sudden, within 50 pages, the lights are going off because you wrote about Lai Changxin and it just completed some thoughts that I was mulling over. And yeah, we're going to have an interesting conversation about Lai Changxin. 00:20:40    CHRISTOPHER MEYER That touches my heart because I've always been a brother of the United States and I've felt so disheartened that bad people have gotten in between us and we have to stop that. And as you say, we need to get together on this. I've reached some good thinkers in the US and there's now things brewing. So let's keep it going. You got it. 00:21:01    Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations. Thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes, One CA Podcast.
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  • 210: Andreas Eckel on NATO Civil Military Cooperation
    Welcome to the One CA Podcast. I'm your host, Jack Gaines.  Today, Colonel Andreas Eckel, commander of the NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence, joins us to discuss the center's work to prepare the alliance for future crises or disasters.    So, let's get started.  --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to Jan Křtitel Novák, Jimmy McHugh, and Dorothy Fields for the original version of Diga Diga Do, which aired in 1928 and was then performed by Duke Ellington.  Ellington's version can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3aJ_9IAIjQ&t=1s --- Transcript 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the One CA podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. Today, Colonel Andreas Echel, commander of the NATO Civic Center of Excellence, joins us to discuss the center's work to prepare the alliance for future crisis and disasters. So let's get started. 00:00:19 ANDREAS ECKEL What we need to understand a little bit better, and I think that was a very brutal lesson we identified in Afghanistan and in Mali as well, is that military functions in different societies. very, very differently. We have an idea how military looks like and how it works. It might work more the Italian style or the German style or the US style. But basically, I think we have a common set of ideas how military works. And military works completely different in Mali than in Afghanistan than in Germany. And that is based on different societies. So how do we figure that out? It's a very good question. If I had a quick and sharp answer to that one, I think I would be the winner of the $1 million question. There are some ingredients to tackle that problem. And one of the ingredients is to understand the environment a little bit better. And that leads to civil military cooperation. The one centerpiece of civil military cooperation is to understand the environment better. to nest military activities in the civil environment in a better way. It creates more converging effects and creates less harm to the civil population. And I think the next thing is you need to have long -lasting relationships. Relationship that is built up, that's great. If it lasts one year, that's great. And if you just end it then, Basically, you have achieved almost nothing. So long -lasting relationships and to understand the civil environment better. And we have to understand that we are not the ivory tower of knowledge. What do we know? What does the military know about Mali and Afghanistan? Basically nothing. We have to be more and better in contact with the civil organizations, with academia, with knowledge centers. that are engaged in those areas since 20, 30, 40, 50 years. And we have to be in a dialogue with them and have to extract their knowledge about the key civil factors and have to integrate that better in military considerations. 00:02:32 JACK GAINES So you have to be a diplomat in two directions because you've got to be reaching out to the partner nation like Mali, working with her counterparts there. You have to be a diplomat with partner agencies within the government and academia, as you were saying, or else you're going to miss a step. So you really have to work your way across the spectrum. 00:02:52 ANDREAS ECKEL Yeah, I like your picture of being a diplomat because exactly as you mentioned, it's a diplomat in both ways, but you have to be a translator as well. So civil environment, civil actors, civil counterparts speak a different language than we. And we really have to make sure that what they say. is understood by the military and what the military means properly translated in how the civilians understand it. 00:03:17 JACK GAINES You know, and that's a good point because I've seen civil affairs civic officers come in and try to brief leadership on certain issues. And if it wasn't absolutely clear and in the language that that matter knew, they usually were dismissed and it wasn't as effective an operation because of it. 00:03:34 ANDREAS ECKEL And by the way, at the beginning of my career in the military function of CIMIC, it happened to me too. So one of my first appearance of the stage briefing the commander about some civil factors was a complete disaster because I underestimated how many minutes I only have to bring over some key messages to the commander. So I talked too long and did not come to the point. And I think that's the point where the CCOE is really in a responsibility. We have to provide in our courses the overview, the background, and we provide expertise and challenge them with tasks to apply the expertise. But at the very end of every course, we tell them, hey, CIMIC is important, and it is important to understand the environment, and it is important to integrate civil factors and military considerations. However, when you are confronted with decision makers, Your product needs to be crisp and sharp. If you provide a product to your commander, which exceeds three pages, then you can throw it in the dustbin. By the way, one page is better than three pages. And I think simakers have the tendency, and I include myself specifically into that one, to speak too long and to explain too long and not to come to the point. And if at the end of your statement there is no so what and what's next, well, then don't say anything. That's better. 00:05:08 JACK GAINES Well, for this podcast, I appreciate you speaking too much. That's a good thing. But I also understand it's a challenge, but once you get used to it, I think it's super, super helpful. 00:05:19 ANDREAS ECKEL helpful. What we both concluded coming to the point should not be mixed up with not doing your analysis. Only because you have two minutes to brief your commander about a major actor that will impact his operation. doesn't mean that your analysis should only be two minutes. So you have to provide the analysis for an in -depth briefing, if required, to integrate that knowledge and your assessment in the staff work of the other branches. So it needs to be both a very in -depth, precise analysis and assessment. And then it is your time on the stage. The light will shine on you for two minutes. That's it. 00:05:59 JACK GAINES That brings up a story on my side. sent one of my pitch decks to a former boss. And he took it, he read it, and then he read all of the sources that I had put in the back. And so he knew the subject just as well as I did when we met. And I was like, holy cow. Yes, it's important to do good research before you put together your summary because you never know how deep somebody's going to dive into an issue. And if you've done bad research and they catch it, you're done. So one of the things that... Being that diplomat, both to the military and to other government bodies. One thing that I found at the Strategic Foresight Conference, and it was in your report as well, is that SIMIC needs clarification of capabilities in peace and crisis. And what feedback I got from meetings was that not all militaries have a strong relationship with their public. That's a big concern because if a military doesn't have the trust. When you get to a crisis or a disaster, you've got to really overcome a lot in order just to provide aid and support. 00:07:07 ANDREAS ECKEL Yeah, that's a crucial point. I have two takes on that. The first one is we have nations that do allow, on the very lowest tactical level, the interaction between military and the civil world. But it is a question of being honest to ourselves. That is not applicable in all countries. Our countries in the alliance are very restrictive interaction with civil environment, with civil authorities, at least on the lower tactical level. And that brings me to my second point. It's a national responsibility. So when we talk about CIMIC as a military function, then we have to look at it from two sides. One is NATO CIMIC is embedded in a NATO command structure, NATO force structure. However, NATO is operating. on the soil of sovereign nations. So we promote and stimulate that nations build up, maintain, and integrate a kind of simic capability. We call that domestic simic. We made a proposal for what domestic simic is. However, nations are completely free to fill that skeleton with their structures. They can call it a domestic simic. They can call it territorial forces. They can call it Homeland Defense Forces. It doesn't matter how they fill in that skeleton as long as they do provide civil factor integration, as long as they execute civil -military interaction. And for the Alliance as a whole to plan and prepare and conduct successful operations, we need to plug in to the national simic domains and the domestic simic domains. And we have to do that. via the national military structures. So what we do in deterrence and defense -related scenarios is a little bit differing from what we have done in international crisis management in the past. When CIMIC teams from the alliance or whatever security force was implemented in that, we very often did the civil -military interaction with civil partners on the ground by ourselves without using any layer in between us. But when we do that now as NATO in Germany and Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and we have to plug into their military structures and via them with the civil actors on the ground. And nations consider that very differently. So there are nations that say, hey, great that you're in. Please feel free to speak to our civil organizations by yourself. It would be nice if you inform us afterwards. Everything's great. The nations are more restrictive and say, hey, guys. a ministry, whenever you talk to an organization, whenever you talk to civil partners, please do that via us and ask us first. So there is a variety of how nations would like to have that executed, and we as Symmakers have to adapt. 00:10:08 JACK GAINES Right. What I've seen is that disaster relief and crisis coordination between the military and the civil governments is fairly good, but I'm not seeing the emotional side as much. What I mean is, We just had the Marine Corps Marathon. And people all crossed D .C. and around the country came. They ran their 24 miles. These kind of military events where people go, they see some type of form of patriotism, honor guards at sporting events or marathons or the military band performing on the park plots. Those things make a difference. And I don't know if that was also included in your... Have you seen anything like that? 00:10:55 ANDREAS ECKEL In the last years, when we talked about the use of military assets in our nations, it was to overcome disasters. It was to provide military assistance to civil organizations to overcome flooding, fires, or whatever. But the situation has changed a little bit. And now it is not so much about military assistance in case of man -made big disasters. It's more about civil defense. It's more about stimulating the civil support to military operations and the mutual support in case of crisis and war. And I think that notion is quite new to many European countries. In Germany, it was... support of the military to the civil authorities in case of disasters. But when you look into Sweden, Norway, and Finland, they have since decades a kind of total defense strategy. They have a DNA about that the whole of the nation needs to be ready to defend the nation. And that starts already when you go into your cellar. Is there water? Is there food? Are there batteries? And when you do that in Finland, Sweden, Norway, the answer is yes, there is food and there is water. And I was quite astonished. A couple of years ago, I had a NATO course in Helsinki. At that time, when Helsinki was still a NATO partner and not a NATO nation. And it was an exported course from NATO School of Ammergau. And during the weekend, we had the opportunity to visit Helsinki. And we... came across a protection infrastructure was located to protect the civilians. And the lady asked us, do you have an idea for how many citizens of Helsinki we have shelter? And I said, well, 50%. And she was smiling and she was collecting all the numbers. And then she came up and said, for every citizen in Helsinki, there is shelter. And that's the difference. A regularly trained system of civil defense. And military defense working hand in hand. I think that makes a difference. And I see that coming up in Europe. And again, I would like to use the example of Germany. Since the last couple of years, a lot of more effort has been put into the training and the exchange of information and the exercising of those structures. And I think we are getting there. The point is... When you have dismantled those structures, those strategies since 1990, because our enemy was disappearing, never disappeared. He was just dormant and has been woken up a couple of years ago. But to reinstall that, reactivate that, revitalize that, that takes years and years. So we are at the beginning. I'm a very optimistic person. I strongly hope that we are getting to a point quick enough that when The Russian beer is looking again to Europe when he has solved his problem in Ukraine, that we are ready at that point. And there are substantial measurements that we need to be ready latest in four to five years. And CIMIC plays a role in that because your armed forces can be as good as possible when the civil environment is vulnerable and stays vulnerable and is not able to absorb shocks and to compensate the shocks at a better level after the shock. then you will lose the conflict. That's crystal clear. Even in that time in 2023, where it seemed, at least for some time, that the Ukrainians have regained the initiative, the Russians did attack the civil infrastructure, the energy infrastructure, the transport infrastructure, the health infrastructure. And they were still winning at that battlefield, although they had massive casualties on the fighting battlefield. And I think where Ukraine will run into massive problems this year is that the Russians may not have the big tactical victory. They may not have the breakthrough through the Ukrainian defense lines. But what they will do is they will seriously damage the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, health infrastructure, transport infrastructure. Third year in a row. And I'm not sure if the Ukrainians will be really able to compensate that this time. 00:15:40 JACK GAINES It's a real challenge. The thing that I see with Ukraine is that there's also a recruiting issue. They're struggling to keep up with manpower. And there's some international volunteers coming in, but probably not enough compared to what the Russians are bringing in. So it's a challenge of numbers in a lot of ways. They do build that trust and that familiarity with the military. So having the military band come out and play on the Konigstrasse makes a difference. Or like they did in Poland, having American and Polish troops go with a vehicle and park in the middle of a Platz and take photos with kids, it makes a difference. 00:16:24 ANDREAS ECKEL You're right. Your argument is good. And it connects pretty well with the... decisions we have to make in Europe right now. And that decision is that we have to nest the military better into the societies. But what needs to be installed, reactivated, and built up is a whole of society approach for resilience and civil defense. 00:16:52 JACK GAINES Okay. The biggest challenge right now is sabotage, which has been happening. in and around Europe, the Chinese ship that cut the communication lines, the water poisoning in Germany. So there seems to be already challenges in security. 00:17:09 ANDREAS ECKEL SIMIC plays, first of all, a vital role in understanding the impact of such events, as we do not only look at the impact on military infrastructure and military organizations and units, but it's our task to look how those events impact the civil actors in the civil environment. And that will have definitely a result on the capability of a civil environment to provide support to military activities. So it's a kind of circle. And we are pushing that constantly to have a permanent assessment cycle on what we do, what happens to us, how does that impact the civil environment and the impacted civil environment? How is that still able? to provide the support to the military. And I think as we are in that position to have those connections to the other organizations and to provide a holistic assessment about the civil environment, that plays a vital role in that one. Absolutely. 00:18:11 JACK GAINES So do you see that as the future of CIMIC from now going forward is to build that more holistic partner nation? 00:18:17 ANDREAS ECKEL I would like to use the... definition of multi -domain operations as it is currently used in NATO, and that is the orchestration of all military activities to achieve converging effects. And I see the future role of CIMIC very much in that synchronization effort. So military capabilities are much, much less available than in the past. So when we think about what we need about capacities and resources to achieve our military strategic objectives, when we go into the details, 60, 70, partly 80 % of what we need as resource is not generated within the military. It needs to be contracted and provided by a civil environment. And that means that there needs to be a constant assessment process about the availability of those 60, 70, 80 % civil support. And it needs to be thoroughly assessed because that has a pushing out effect on the civil environment. When we use the trains for military equipment, then those trains cannot be used to support and supply the civil environment. So I think the future of CIMEC is in that synchronization bit with the non -military activities to reach those converging effects. And that pretty much fits into the whole of government, whole of society approach of defense. 00:19:49 JACK GAINES Interesting. So CIMIC is in multi -domain operations, has its own multi -domain operation because it's coordinating the civil, government, NGOs, whoever is not formal military. in cooperation or in conjunction with the military's multi -domain operations. So you've got a multi -tiered coordination process. 00:20:12 ANDREAS ECKEL process. I think we do not run our own multi -domain operations. A multi -tiered task, I think that that captures it quite well. But I personally prefer to speak more about cooperation because coordination is a very tricky expression, especially in Europe. as coordination requires someone who allows to be coordinated and someone who has a coordinating authority. And in the interaction with our civil partners, it's more cooperation, ranging from we do exist beside each other to full integrated planning and operations. There's a continuum of that area of cooperation. So I do really prefer to speak more about cooperation than coordination. 00:21:04 JACK GAINES Is there any other topics or thoughts that you want to add to the conversation? 00:21:11 ANDREAS ECKEL For me, it's really important to highlight the future concepts like multi -domain operations and to establish and maintain the connection with the current concepts. So it is important to keep the future world of NATO connected to the current operational world of NATO. That is exactly why we run the annual Simic Foresight Conference, is to connect the here and now with the time period of one to two years to the future concepts, 10, 20 years. And secondly, the closer connection and the better synchronization of the national efforts with the alliance efforts. That is really, I think, a key centerpiece of our future success. So in my understanding, it is ongoing. It is happening in the alliance as we speak right now. So alliance, joint headquarters, strategic headquarters have established contacts to national military authorities and do exchange information. But I think that needs to become more intensive, more regularly and more information flow to both sides. And that needs to be not only... foreseen conceptually and structurally, it needs to be trained and exerciseda reagularly. And I think that's really a clear measurement of success if we are able to exercise it in the future massively. And thirdly, I think the aspect of human security and protection of civilians, that is something which creates a dilemma for every military leader because he would like to achieve his military objectives. That is either to defeat the enemy or to force him to do something or to force him to stay away from something, which means the application of massive violence to the enemy. However, when we learn something from the recent international crisis or from the war in Ukraine, then what we have learned is the battlefield is full of civilians that have requirements, that have needs. The battlefield is full of organizations, non -governmental governmental organizations that try to provide a certain amount of services to the civilians. And it doesn't matter if it is a war zone or the rear area or the area behind the rear area. We have to realize that it is and will remain full of civilians. To evacuate a city like Kiev is nonsense. That will never happen. 23 million people. Yeah, good luck with that one. And even if you try, the majority of the capabilities will be provided by the civilian world. So human security, protection of civilians are concepts which are mandatory for NATO. NATO has adhered to it. We have adopted it in our strategies, in our plans, into our operations. But what does that really mean? How do we really translate protection of civilian and human security? into operations on the operational and even on the tactical level. And I think that needs some assistance, how to operationalize it, how to conduct, how to do it. This assistance, in my understanding, is called mindset and SIMIC. Terrific. It's good to do SIMIC, but you have to talk about it. It's good to increase the awareness, but you have to publish it. So I am very grateful and very thankful to have the opportunity to talk with you. Thank you very much. I appreciate you coming on. Thank you very much and have a good day. 00:25:00 JACK GAINES working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations. Thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes, One CA Podcast.
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  • 209: Kurt Dykstra and Joshua Weikart on joining Civil Affairs
    In this episode Brian Hancock talks with Kurt Dykstra and Joshua Weikart to discuss the 38 Golf Program, the Functional Specialty Team Construct, and the recent Functional Specialty Team Symposium. Major Dykstra and Captain Weikert, welcome to the show. Thank you very much. Wonderful to be here. --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in current or former military personnel, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with the people and leadership of a partner nation. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to Art Music for a sample from the song "January | Instrumental Background Music." Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2E0orz_C33I --- Transcript 00:00:03 INTRODUCTION Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected] or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. 00:00:39 BRIAN HANCOCK I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I will be your host for this session. Today, we have with us Major Kurt Dykstra and Joshua Weikert  and  Joshua Weikert  and Captain Joshua Weikert to discuss the 38 golf program and the recent Functional Specialty Team Symposium. Major Dykstra and Captain Weikert, welcome to the show. Thanks very much. Wonderful to be here. Thank you, sir. 00:01:26 BRIAN HANCOCK A quick disclaimer while we're here that the remarks of myself and the participants are solely ours. All right, gentlemen, let's jump into it. From the beginning, what attracted you to U.S. Army civil affairs? Well, I can start that answer. So I'm a bit older, as you might have gathered from my bio. 00:01:43 KURT DYKSTRA a bit older, as you might have gathered from my bio. And at various points in my adult life, I had thought about entering into military service. And for one reason or another, It just didn't happen. And it was always a great regret in my life that I had not served and saw it as something that I wish I would have done. And then about four or so years ago, I got a call from a friend of a friend who at the time was a major who was recruiting for this new golf program. And we really didn't know each other, but we sort of had moved in similar circles and knew the same people and those sorts of things. And my wife and I were hiking the Appalachian Trail and I was having breakfast one morning and got a phone call from Colonel Koinga, as he retells the story, I think within an hour or two, I said something like, sounds good to me, let's do it. Of course, I did talk with my wife and those sorts of things, but that's my pathway in and a bit unique perhaps, but I think a story that has some resonance with many of the other gulfs, particularly those who were not prior service, that this was fulfilling an opportunity that they had, that they had wished that they had taken earlier, which was to serve the country through the military. 00:02:51 BRIAN HANCOCK the country through the military. Well, first of all, Kurt, you're not that old. You look very young and healthy to me. And so you're doing something right. So good for you. I'm thrilled that you have chosen to give both the Army and civil affairs a chance. We definitely need the type of skills that you bring to the table. Now, let me turn to you, Captain Weicker. Tell me a little bit about your journey getting here. Well, I was a prior service soldier. 00:03:16 JOSHUA WEIKERT  prior service soldier. Also being the pre -law advisor at my university, I had a pre -law student who was interested in the Army JAG program. And she had asked me to look into direct commissioning programs in the Army in general, knowing that I was a veteran and had some experience in this area. And I stumbled across the 38 Gulf page on the Army Talent Management website. And it was such an immediately obvious fit because I teach politics, but I also do politics. I work for the House of Representatives. And for that matter, when I go out looking for faculty members to hire, I like looking for people who are practitioners as well as being scholars. And this really dovetailed very nicely into that model. And it struck me as something with a very clear need. It also struck me as something that, especially as we think about lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and 20 years of deployments, that this was an area where the Army could really bone up its skills and get more into capacity building both within our formations and also the places where we operate. So it struck me as something that was both important and extremely interesting. 00:04:13 BRIAN HANCOCK Well, very glad that you're here. The background that you both have in politics and helping. do governance on an almost daily basis. It makes me wonder, how would we train something like transitional governance? This is one of our core capabilities. I don't know if the program does things like that. I think there's a big future for us in this area. And both of you have the background to help us move in that direction. Well, in the early 2000s, 00:04:44 JOSHUA WEIKERT  the DOD had... conducted a review of all the civil administration and civil affairs tasks that were out there that the Army engages in. And they came up with a list of something like 1 ,400 different tasks. And they combed through this list and started identifying things that are not currently met. So where are the areas where the Army needs help? And out of that derived these 18 skill identifiers within the 38 Gulf program, covering a broad range of civil skills. And these include things like... finance, education, and border security, and law, regulation, and policy, and this cultural heritage and property protection. And the goal of the program is essentially to enhance a commander's ability to operate in a stable civil environment, to foresee and address any likely challenges that should crop up, so that commanders can focus on accomplishing their primary image. 00:05:33 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Yeah, if I might jump in a little bit on that as well, either read the book or see the movie Monuments Men, then that gives you a little bit of a sense. In World War II, The U .S. were heading across Western Europe. They needed help to identify certain things, whether it's art, whether it's the significance of structures. And those are skills that the Army just didn't have. So the George Clooney's of the world, who at the time were art historians and museum curators, were brought into the Army's orbit to assist in those tasks. And that's kind of the history of the program that goes way back when, and then it was recently restarted in many ways and broadened as Captain Weigert. has been describing. So in some ways, I describe our role as consultants with specific civilian side expertise that the Army simply does not have to assist the Army to be able to do things that it otherwise might not be able to do. So we get called upon to assist in some of those areas that are more specialized than what the Army generally might have. And in other ways, like other civil affairs officers, you know, we're kind of the Army's diplomatic corps. So it's really those combinations, but the Gulf program specifically brings a very specific and in -depth civilian skill set to be used for Army purposes. 00:06:47 BRIAN HANCOCK set to be used for Army purposes. It sounds a little bit similar to some of the specialists we have with surgeons and lawyers, but also different at the same time. When we were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, we definitely could have used these capabilities in all of these special functional areas. The Department of State tries their best to fill that gap, but the reality is that they're a relatively small organization that isn't necessarily equipped to go to non -permissive environments for extended periods of time. So for transitional governments, I think the heavy lift tends to fall on the military, and you really can't rebuild a government without trying to rebuild the economy and those other threads that tie into that tapestry. I'm very excited for the future with you guys on board. One of the initial challenges is that there wasn't necessarily a clear career progression through every rank for these soldiers. They couldn't follow the 38 Alpha career progression. Has that been relooked at? We do have a quasi -path through your military education. 00:07:57 JOSHUA WEIKERT  a quasi -path through your military education. We do not yet have a basic officer leadership course, though we are currently piggybacking on Medical Services Bullock down here at Fort Sam. which is actually where they both are right now. But my understanding is that a 38 golf at CA Bullock course is in development, and I volunteered some of my time doing some of the course materials for that. And of course, we do have the civil affairs captain's course as well as an option. Beyond that, I'm not certain at all. But for Major Dykstra, if he has more information on that. 00:08:26 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Much of this has been like jazz. There's been a certain underlying beat that's there, and there's a lot of improvisation that happens along the way. And Captain Weikert is exactly correct that we do DCC largely with the JAG DCC. And then we sort of peg on BOLIC, either AG or AMED, and AMED seems to be the preferred course right now. And to me, this is an area for improvement. We've gone through two school experiences without having any sort of direct training for what it is that we do. And that feels to me like an area that we can improve upon. And I think that is in process, as Captain Weikert mentioned with. With large organizations, particularly the U.S. Army, all that sort of thing takes time. Yeah, it does. But I do think that as the program matures, as there are more people within it for longer periods of time, a lot of the questions about career path and specifics along those lines, frankly, either be worked out by doctrine or they'll be worked out by the process of having people going through these programs and through the ranks and getting OERs and those kinds of things. So I'm not as concerned about that. A ladder piece is what I think that it would be beneficial for the golf program to have better formal education laid out sooner as we see with most other MOCs. 00:09:37 BRIAN HANCOCK other MOCs. It makes sense to me. It is clever, though, to piggyback on a professional MOS. Many reservists have a similar challenge who aren't 38 golfs because a lot of the professional military education that we funnel through. is geared towards combat arms. And of course, for reserve soldiers, what we do is largely support. But in terms of professional military education, understanding some of these other professions like medicine and pieces of logistics and information operations, professional military education historically has not been geared to advance the tradecraft of those individuals. So I think there's a larger movement within the Army at large, though, to create more specialized training. Unlike the Marine Corps, where they have fewer MOSs and folks have to be a little bit more of a generalist, the fact that we have so many specialty MOSs in the Army, I think, lends itself to the ability to stand up individual branches that can run its own training. And within the functional specialties of the 38 golf program, you might even need an entire course dedicated. to each of those functional areas because they're really quite different. 38 golfs are contained within the functional specialty team construct, like the building where they live within a civil affairs unit. Some folks tend to conflate the 38 golf program with the functional specialty team, not the same. But let's take it a step further. Since the functional specialty team which houses the 38 golf program is a military unit, It, of course, has non -commissioned officers in it as well as officers. Three of us happen to be officers, but non -commissioned officers are very important for us to get things done in the Army. What right now is the role of the non -commissioned officer within functional specialty teams? And gentlemen, where do you see that going? Go ahead, Captain Martin. I think that's exactly right. 00:11:40 JOSHUA WEIKERT  right. And in addition, the just traditional roles that NCOs play in almost any unit in formation in terms of like training plan development and... upward input and things like that. I think the role of NCOs is all the more valuable and important in an FXFB section that includes a significant number of direct commission officers. You need that reinforcing experience even more in that set. And also, as we found out at the symposium in April, many of we had NCOs in attendance, and many of these NCOs are themselves fairly accomplished within their careers on the civilian side. So they have SI. contributions to make as well. So they're an essential part of this formation. 00:12:19 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Yeah. One of our NCOs was a lawyer of 35 plus years, had done really remarkable things in the civilian side. So the idea that I, as a newly commissioned officer, would come in as the experienced person on the civilian side and he was more experienced on the Army side was true on the one hand, but it also was so much more than that because his civilian expertise was also first rate and really quite impressive. 00:12:41 BRIAN HANCOCK first rate and really quite impressive. That's amazing. And I don't know if the functional specialty teams will select for that type of talent. It certainly exists, at least within the Army Reserve. We're very skill -rich. That is exciting to me. Now, prior to the establishment of the 38 golf program, who was manning the functional specialty teams? 00:13:03 JOSHUA WEIKERT  There is great talent in our formations already. So we had, for example, veterinarians. We had public health practitioners. and people that have civil affairs and what we now think of as sort of 38 Gulf skill sets. With the 38 Gulf program, you have subject matter experts who can get a little further into the weeds in areas where we don't have as much expertise. If someone came up to a practicing JAG lawyer and said, look, we need to design a judiciary system because we're about to massively disrupt the civil administration of this country, they're going to be in the ballpark. They understand courts and civil and criminal procedure and things like that. but they might clearly consider things that I would think of in terms of governmental engineering around separation of powers, how those are selected. And that is what I think 38 Gulfs add to that functional specialty. It lets us accomplish a lot more within the same formation. That makes sense to me. 00:13:51 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Yeah, I completely agree with that. And clearly the civil affairs units and the FXSPs in particular were doing tremendous work prior to the visioning of the 38 Gulf program. In many cases, it seems as though it might be because of the particular and unique skill sets of those officers and NCOs. I think the Gulf program is trying to actually more systematically identify and bring into the Army persons who have depth to skill. 00:14:17 BRIAN HANCOCK to skill. What I'm hearing is that 38 Gulfs bring out more capability and apply it to the often very complex civil social problems that we work on in the civil affairs community. I read a fair amount of peer -reviewed literature, and I can tell you from that standpoint, since the 38 Gulfs have entered the community, I've seen a lot more peer -reviewed literature coming out. So I think there definitely is some effect from this program, and I'm really excited to see where it's going to lead. Now, at the end of April, the 304th Civil Affairs Brigade, which is commanded by Colonel Toby Humphries, convened the first -ever functional specialty team symposium. How did that come about? What's the history there? Colonel Daniel Fletcher is the FXSP chief of the drill fourth. 00:15:03 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  chief of the drill fourth. So I was as green as they come. And Colonel Fletcher, he was incredibly helpful and kind to me to help me figure out some things. And through that, he learned that there was an onboarding and utility gap of how are we supposed to use these golfs? And he asked around up and down the chain in other units and found out that lots of people were having the same kind of question. So this, I think, was the impetus that he had then to say, well, let's get some people together to talk about some of these issues and see if we can't find solutions to some of these challenges. And then he and our CEO, Colonel Humphreys, talked. And Colonel Humphreys was, as I'm told, immediately enthusiastically on board for this effort. And then through lots of laboring hours and the work of many good officers and NCOs, we put together this symposium. It was a really rich learning experience, let alone a great networking opportunity. 00:16:01 BRIAN HANCOCK That sounds amazing. I almost wish I had been there. I know one of my mentors, Colonel Bradford Hughes, was there, and probably some of his team as well. What were some of the topics you guys discussed, and did you come to any conclusions or lessons learned that you'd like to share with the community? We had essentially three large chunks. 00:16:19 JOSHUA WEIKERT  three large chunks. One was around organization and operations of 38 golfs and ethics SP sections. One was around training and doctrine. And then we specifically also discussed recruitment and personnel and lengthy discussions around accessions and initial onboarding. And we covered a lot of ground in three days. The white paper that is just about ready to be disseminated details the findings and does make some recommendations. But I think far more important than any particular recommendation that came out of it was the fact that we were able to draw all these discussions into one place and one location at one time. I have to believe, greatly increases the likelihood that they are ultimately acted upon because we were able to draw from everyone's best practices and identify where our collective gaps were. And as we sort of pass this up to USKPOC and the command level, this is something that is going to be a little more valuable simply because we were able to reach consensus on even just our concerns. 00:17:17 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Exactly. It was a tremendously rich experience and a breadth of topics. And you mentioned Colonel Hughes. And he and his team have, I think, sort of set the pace for many of the KCOMs in terms of how they're using gulps in particular. And so I was a bit familiar with him through the literature and through various email types of things, but I'd never really talked with him before. Unfortunately, he couldn't be there in person, so he was presented by a team. But then got the chance to meet him this summer in Madison, Wisconsin, at a training event at the University of Wisconsin. And you want to talk about officers who are... just stellar in terms of their knowledge, but also stellar in terms of character and quality of person. Carl Hughes is right up there as well. So it was just an incredible experience to learn from other KCOMs and to understand history and some of the doctrine issues that arise and to identify road bumps or landmines and avoid them or fix them. But a really great experience that I think was appreciated by all who attended. 00:18:17 JOSHUA WEIKERT  all who attended. One of the things that came out of the symposium for me in terms of like genuinely new things that I learned, is that at one point there was the establishment of this Institute for Military Support to Governance, which was formed specifically to identify and support reservists with civilian acquired skills that were applicable to these functional areas. And it sounds like it was a forerunner in many ways to what we think of as the 38 Gulf program today. And it still exists, at least as far as we can tell, absolutely unclear what current status is. But this is something that came up several times during the symposium, is that that could be something that could function as a vehicle to address some of the coordinating. challenges we face and maybe even some of the accessions on board be challenged. And it will just remain to be seen if that's something we can vitalize or revitalize. I love the way you're thinking. 00:19:01 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  Sir, this is part of the benefit of having an academic like Captain Weikert in the planning team. He thinks institutionally and thinks strategically in terms of the doctrine aspect of things. It's not just operational or tactical. The other thing I would mention is Captain Weikert mentioned The white paper from the symposium is soon to be published, but there was an article in the latest edition of The Shield that gives a more thinner or more popular description of what the symposium did and what it accomplished and who was there. So I would encourage any listener who is at least somewhat curious about the symposium to check out The Shield article and then be able to look out for the upcoming white paper. 00:19:40 BRIAN HANCOCK Let me ask you, gentlemen, a test question now that I've got you both warmed up and unsuspecting here. Field manual, three -tack, five -step, civil affairs operations, our Bible, recently updated. It added this new task of civil network development and engagement, or CNDE, which in itself is pretty complicated because we're talking about mapping and engaging interrelated complex adaptive systems. Okay, so mathematically, at least, it's already very complicated. Now, considering how deep the expertise is, within the 38 Gulf community, I would suspect that those folks with those credentials in those communities are probably in a very good position to advance civil network development engagement within their specialty areas. Now let's talk about that concept within the broader Army concept. We're all professionals at this level of our career. How are we as an institution, in your opinion, measuring the strength of the professional networks that we are bringing with us, which are an asset for both civilian and the military? How could we include the strength of someone's network as, say, part of their promotion or board packages? Do you have any thoughts how the Army as an institution could take a better measure? of our professional networks and ability to leverage them to achieve commander's effects. I can say that it did come up at the symposium among that group of 38 Golfs and FXSP members in attendance that this was an essential part of just understanding what our own capabilities were and how do we track and map where everyone lands in terms of their skill sets. 00:21:13 JOSHUA WEIKERT  that it did come up at the symposium among that group of 38 Golfs and FXSP members in attendance that this was an essential part of just understanding what our own capabilities were and how do we track and map where everyone lands in terms of their skill sets. So it was something of general interest at the symposium, and it also came up in the context of how we developed training. for 38 golfs and for civil affairs units more generally. And those efforts are likely to be ongoing. But in terms of how to do it, I think it should be relatively straightforward because we already have some of these things sort of populated in the soldier talent profile at HRC, for example. And if we simply adapt that and augment it to specifically identify for civil skills and civil networks, it shouldn't be too challenging to at least get that on paper. Now, how you operationalize that and put it to work is a more challenging question, obviously. 00:22:03 KURT DYKSTRA But it does seem to me as though there is a lot of ad hoc -ness to the way this is happening so far. The point and purpose of the Gulf program is to really get into uniform persons with skills that the Army was lacking. And if we simply have them but don't know about them and don't utilize them and leverage them and execute on them, then maybe to put it in a more concrete way, if we're simply relying upon, I know a guy or I know a gal who has that experience and they happen to be over there. in the 352, well, that's better than not having that information. But it's not really how you want to be running a program like this. Better to have a much more institutionalized, formalized means of understanding networks so that we can affect the broad array of a civil society. Because as we all understand, if a civil society breaks down, it's not just one thing that needs to be addressed. It's about 175 things that need to be addressed. in order for civil society to work. So there's still work to be done there, but I am heartened by the fact that the Gulf community is a robust one intrapersonally and continuing to be more so. And these topics of more institutionalizing that kind of knowledge is absolutely on the topic of conversation for many people who are thinking more seriously about how to do that. 00:23:18 BRIAN HANCOCK people who are thinking more seriously about how to do that. I love the fact that this community is actually thinking about these difficult questions that not only affect the army, but... affect the force as a whole and strategically affect our ability to compete and deter, ideally avoiding conflict altogether. And these are things that we have to understand. What networks, how do we invest in them? How do we, if necessary, appropriate them to steer the world away from costly conflict? That is something that needs more attention, 00:23:49 JOSHUA WEIKERT  more attention, is there is a very, very, very robust peace mission for 38 Gulf. And I think it's important to remember, too, as we think about how we exploit these talents. For example, the same way our conservationists and cultural property protection folks have a partnership with the Smithsonian, we would want to see that within every skill identifier, that institutional partner becomes a potential warehouse of understanding what their aside people can do and how they can contribute as well. So I think at present, it is very interpersonal, and it's great that we do have that network of folks. But I also think that that is something that will get augmented once we have everything built out to its fullest expression. Carty, do you have a thought on that? 00:24:26 KURT DYKSTRA  I was just going to say that we want to be in a spot to have those networks built out and an understanding of the places in which we operate before any hostilities break out. These things are happening and they're happening because of the good work of a whole lot of people, but the program is still pretty young. So we're still gaining our legs and still building it out. And with the kind of caliber of people we have in uniform now through this program, I have no doubt that the future is really, 00:24:50 BRIAN HANCOCK have no doubt that the future is really, really bright. That's wonderful to hear. The Army has done conflict for a long time, right? This idea of competition is still somewhat new to us, so we're not going to expect overnight our doctrine and schooling to change to be able to help us secure that win in competition. But I'm seeing encouraging signs, and I know we're going to head in that direction, and I really believe the 38 Golfs are going to have a very big role as we look to maximize our return on investment and competition, ideally avoiding conflict altogether. Now, at the symposium, I imagine maybe behind closed doors, a very professional and upfront group who's not afraid to talk about challenges. Within those conversations, what... at present, do you see as the single greatest challenge that needs to be overcome within the 38 Golf community? And what are your suggestions to do so? I'll say one thing. 00:25:52 KURT DYKSTRA  To a person who was there, yes, there were some frustrations or constructive criticism ideas, but there was not a person in that room who was not enthusiastic about the program and grateful to be a part of it. So I think part of the challenge in a twofold piece, and both of these things have to do with the program being relatively new. The first one I would say is the accession process and the identification process. How does someone go from never having worn a uniform in the history of their life to commissioning? And how does that process work? And how long does it take for that to happen? Part of the challenge that we see, and I think it's getting better, I was maybe second class of Gulfs that came in, is that it was an on -again, off -again process for close to two years. And if we are trying to identify highly skilled, highly talented, highly experienced civilian personnel to come into uniform, a two -year process is problematic. 00:26:51 BRIAN HANCOCK is problematic. It's strange to me because my recruiter had me in boots before I left his office. And that was actually part of the discussion. 00:26:59 KURT DYKSTRA AND  that was actually part of the discussion. In so many other areas, Army recruiting is really, really strong, and there's a clearly established path that you do. And because of the newness and kind of quirkiness of this program, there's less of that, and we're sort of building the ship as we're sailing. Yesterday in the hotel here at Fort Sam, I met a thoracic surgeon who was newly commissioned. And some of those areas that maybe have experience with highly skilled civilian practitioners. coming newly into the Army that have paths that are a bit more developed than what the golf program is. So again, I think it has gotten much better, but it takes time. 00:27:36 JOSHUA WEIKERT  time. I think as the program grows and we sort of meet our staffing benchmarks and as we get more practice and more reps in the process, I do believe a lot of this will hire. I think it will as well. The other thing I would say is having the ability for a civil affairs bullet to come into play. 00:27:49 KURT DYKSTRA  having the ability for a civil affairs bullet to come into play. We latched on with mainly the JAG officers for GCC and there's... a lot that's great about that, especially as a lawyer. It was very strange. So there were about 100 of us in our Bolick class. All but five of us, I think, were JAG officers. But I was the lawyer who wasn't the JAG. And I was the old guy. So it was really, it was a fascinating couple of months and a lot of fun. But we were sort of sitting along the side as they were talking lots of things about JAG school and what happened next for them. And then to be at AMED Bolick, again, it's a similar sort of thing. And there's, especially for someone new to the Army like me, being around people in the Army is invaluable, regardless of whether it's directly related to my MOS or not. But at some point, it would be helpful to get some specialized training about what it is that the Army expects me to do, apart from the civilian experience that I bring to the table. 00:28:45 JOSHUA WEIKERT  In terms of challenges within 38 Gulf, I also find that, organizationally speaking, is how we connect 38 Gulfs with commanders and missions. Because at present, we are relying on these informal networks to pass information along about we need six Delta to go to Poland in two weeks. Who's available? You know, things like that. That's always going to be inefficient, for one thing. We realize a little too much on that ad hoc communications network. And it also means that commanders can't go looking for 38 Gulfs either. So what I think will have to happen sooner or later is having some kind of centralized. repository of mission and or task information that 38 Gulfs can go to and look at ongoing missions or missions in planning. And at the same time, some kind of searchable database where commanders can go find those people. And there are institutions and organizations that have this set up in existence. So it's not something we need to reinvent. It's just something we need to consolidate because it is just very unlikely that every formation in a civil affairs unit will happen to have the right people for their region and their missions. We need to be better to get good information down to every individual 38 golf and up to every commander. And that's just going to take time and awareness to them. 00:29:51 BRIAN HANCOCK time and awareness to them. That makes perfect sense. So that would help you grow in your skill set and mature your capability as well for everyone's benefit. Totally sold on that. And I think in time, as you mentioned, that's probably going to be developed and roll out. We've talked a lot about the 38 golf program today. Very exciting. I think certainly the best thing that's happened to civil affairs in decades. And I believe over time it'll be one of the best things that's ever happened to the Army and to the military at large. Very exciting. Those in the audience who are listening, who are interested in learning more and perhaps going through that application process, which will shrink in time, of course, what are those steps they need to take? If someone raised their hand and says, sign me up to 38 Golf, what do they do? 00:30:44 JOSHUA WEIKERT  the Army and Hound Management website. If you just Google 38 Gulf Army, I believe the first tip that you'll see. And it's been built out over the past three years, adding more context, more information about the steps. But it essentially begins with laying out the basic requirements for the program, which is at least a master's degree in a relevant SI field, and at least professional experience in that as well. Once you've cleared those hurdles, you're then looking at developing your packet, and it does provide good guidance on that. I have already fielded some inquiries from interested NCOs and officers, and there are also some groups that you find on LinkedIn and Signal as well that are very active in discussing this process and how it's going. 00:31:18 BRIAN HANCOCK it's going. Professional football teams don't just recruit from their neighborhood. They go all over the place to get the right specialties, to put them together in the right combination for the right missions and matchups. I love the way you're thinking about putting something together like that. I've honestly felt that... As an institution, one of the things that we should do a little bit better job with in general is knowledge management within the military. If you have deep subject matter expertise, if it's in a very tight area like tech support, they have knowledge bases that you can search. We don't have a lot of tools like that, and we spend a lot of our money on human capital who are producing intellectual property, some of which is lost when a unit rips out or when there isn't a good continuity plan. And of course, the deep knowledge that you're describing, we definitely need a better way to collect, analyze, maintain, and make that accessible. So thinking about 38 Gulfs, and it was described as a consultancy within the Army. 00:32:12 JOSHUA WEIKERT  it was described as a consultancy within the Army. So essentially, a staff officer or commander pauses and says, wait, how do I fill in the blank? That should trigger a call at an RFI down to some kind of 38 Gulf to fill that need. Yeah, and two more comments on that. One, this isn't unique to the Army. 00:32:29 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  to the Army. Any organization of any size will sort of talk about knowledge walking out the door. So this is not a unique situation to the Army, though, of course, it's magnified given the size, scale, and scope of what the U .S. Army does. The second thing I would say is, and this was part of the discussion at the symposium, the Colonel Hughes panel, what the 351st does is they house all of their goals at the KCOM level, as opposed to embedding them in brigades or battalions. And that way... Whether it's the ultimate solution or whether it's a matter of a way to actually get their arms around it, they have a sense as to what their capacity is within the 351st because they're all at the KCOM level and can understand that, oh, we have this issue of an agricultural thing happening in the Philippines. Wonderful. We know who we can send to help out on that mission. As things continue to get better, and they clearly have gotten better. But as this program is longer and more experienced and has more people in it and more knowledge shared through it, I fully expect that the process will get better and the knowledge that we're able to share in social life. 00:33:31 BRIAN HANCOCK I definitely think it will. We're approaching our time for the show. I wanted to give you a few last minutes for each of you. Do you have any final thoughts that you would like to share with the community? First of all, thanks for having us on, 00:33:46 KURT DYKSTRA AND  JOSHUA WEIKERT  on, sir. It's been a real treat to be able to talk with you. In addition to the great resources that Captain Weikert mentioned, feel free to reach out to us if you have questions on the golf program. We may not have all the answers, but we can probably be a good conduit into the network to help get you the answers, or at least the right people who would have the answers. So happy to field any phone calls or emails about the golf program. Awesome. 00:34:07 JOSHUA WEIKERT  And I would just say to anyone who's currently in the pipeline or is thinking about applying or has recently commissioned and is very sort of new to the process, patience is the key. I know it seems like it's taking forever. It has gotten better with every iteration. It seems like the sort of processing time is getting smaller and smaller and all these things. So just hang in there and it does reach a conclusion eventually. 00:34:26 BRIAN HANCOCK a conclusion eventually. Well, thank you both very much, Major Dijkstra and Captain Weikert for coming on the show. That concludes this issue of 1CA Podcast. 00:34:37 Close Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U.S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.
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  • 208: Grant Newsham on the Japan Defense Forces and PRC threat (Part II)
    Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired marine colonel and author of When China Attacks,  A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat.  This is a two-part episode. Grant's biography: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/author/grant-newsham/ Book link: https://www.regnery.com/9781684513659/when-china-attacks/ A recent article: https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/the-us-in-the-pacific-getting-the?utm_source=substack&publication_id=746580&post_id=151553726&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=ercjf&triedRedirect=true --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to the site Cool Jazz Hot Bossa for the sample of Cool Jazz Hot Bossa. (59:00). Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdWUj2NYDYQ --- Transcript: (Part I) 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired Marine Colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat. This is the first of a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 GRANT NEWSHAM I was effectively MarforPak's guy in Asia for a number of years. which worked well in both directions. So I was obviously in Japan, but also did a lot of work for them throughout the region, Southeast Asia as well, Taiwan even, which was a lot of fun. 00:01:13 JACK GAINES Yeah. And you've become a foreign policy advocate in the area. 00:01:16 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. At some point, maybe seven or eight years ago, figured I'd actually done enough stuff to maybe have a few ideas. So I started writing and speak a lot as well. So I guess I'm part of the commentariat. But I seem to write about once a week some topic related to often Asian defense, but sometimes economics, politics, sometimes organized crime. And I do get invited to speak here and there and seem to get a number of television or radio interviews as well. That's really cool. I didn't say I get invited to good things, but I do get the occasional invitation. I used to think it was because I had such insight. Someone told me not all that long ago that actually, if you'll say yes to an interview, you're likely to get more of them. Because the people who book them, they just want to get somebody on. And I thought it was because of my particular wisdom. 00:02:07 JACK GAINES of my particular wisdom. 00:02:09 GRANT NEWSHAM I'm joking a little bit. But obviously, you must have something useful to say. But it is funny. There's one place in Singapore that calls me a lot. It's like their CNN. And they've been calling me. Probably eight years at least, or almost every time, I'll tell the presenters that basically they don't know what they're talking about. And I always think, well, this is the last one, but they keep calling me up. They mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:34 JACK GAINES mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:36 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, I can blame things in a way that sort of suits broadcast and that sort of regular people can understand, you know, 00:02:42 GRANT NEWSHAM that sort of regular people can understand, you know, being a regular person myself. 00:02:47 JACK GAINES Yeah, you learn to disagree without offending. 00:02:49 GRANT NEWSHAM Usually. And it's always sort of a relief, actually, when you can have a different look at things. 00:02:56 JACK GAINES That's good. I always thought you were going to say it is a relief sometimes when you just peel the coat off and then yell at them. 00:03:02 GRANT NEWSHAM The facts speak for themselves. Right. And if it's a presenter, their role is different, and they will generally not have the substantive knowledge that most of the people on the show will have. Right. And so much of what I have to say is often not... in line with accepted wisdom, particularly when it comes to Japan. Sure. So it's often that I'll have to present a different take on things, but they don't seem to be offended. 00:03:27 JACK GAINES Right. You mostly talk about Japan in its current defense fashion or in its foreign policy actions. 00:03:33 GRANT NEWSHAM A lot of that because people have a perception of Japan, for example, as a pacifist country. It cannot fight. It's peace loving. Right. etc. They have a nuclear allergy. You know, just the idea of nuclear weapons in Japan is out of the question. You often hear, well, their constitution won't let them fight. And none of those things are actually true. But it's the received wisdom. It's what people think. And when you simply point out the realities of Japan, that ultimately, at the end of the day, it's a country just like every other. And that the stereotypes about it really aren't correct when it comes to defense security. In fact, they use that the Constitution won't let them have a military. You probably heard it. Yeah. That's the idea. And they don't even call it a military. But the fact is they've got a military, which, according to some ratings, is the fifth most powerful in the world. It depends on how you calculate it, of course. But they call it something else. And what is the actual distinction between offensive and defensive weapons? 00:04:35 JACK GAINES It's usually the strike space. If it's inside your own country defending, then it's a defense space. Once you go out and start taking out other people's cities and moving forces in. 00:04:44 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, for example, they don't have much what you call power projection capability very far off their borders. But they do have a submarine fleet, say over 20 submarines. There's no reason you couldn't send them to the coast of China and start sinking ships. 00:04:59 JACK GAINES True. 00:05:00 GRANT NEWSHAM They've got F -16s. You can put long -range missiles on them and you can fly out of ways and cause people a lot of trouble. But their military really, I would say, is not so good at offense. It's not so good at defense either. And that's something that comes as a surprise to a lot of people. 00:05:15 JACK GAINES Well, do they exercise defense and offense? 00:05:18 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, they have exercises, training, and they put on a pretty good show, particularly when they have visitors come. But they really, until very recently, and even now, they can't do joint operations, which means the air, sea, and ground forces. can't operate together. In fact, they don't even have a radio with which they can communicate easily. They have to jury -rig some relations, these connections. And that's something most people don't understand, because you look at it on paper. Japan has 250 ,000 people in its military, and it's got ships, aircraft, all of it modern and good stuff. 150 ,000 people in its ground self -defense force, their army. But it's not even the sum of its whole. If you imagine each of your limbs, your arms and your legs, each doing whatever it wants without the coordinating function provided by a brain. 00:06:10 JACK GAINES Sounds like me dancing. 00:06:12 GRANT NEWSHAM It would be, yeah. I think that I can picture that, whereas I'm more of an Arthur Murray kind of guy. But it's like that. And nobody can believe that because they think, well, this is the Japanese. It's this advanced modern country, big military, the rich country. And I mean, they can't even do these simple things. Right. The short answer is no, except in some limited circumstances. After 60 years of the U .S.-Japan defense relationship, 80 years after World War II, they still cannot do some of the basic things that a military needs to do, or do them very well, put it that way. But they do train, they exercise, the personnel quality is excellent. You know, we tend to say, well, we've got Japan as our ally, Japan has a military. But the reality is that the U .S. and Japanese forces cannot work very well together. There's one exception, and that's the two navies. The U .S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, called the Maritime Self -Defense Force, they actually do work well. And they show what's doable. 00:07:15 JACK GAINES They probably do dynamic exercises as well as structured ones, so they have to change, have to practice new orders and maneuvers. 00:07:22 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, the nature of naval operations is you can go out... into the sea, and you have more freedom to actually do stuff. But part of it actually was when Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was later chief of naval operations for many years, he was in charge in Japan. He basically laid down the ground rules, which was that the American Navy was going to treat the Japanese like friends, like allies. And that set the tone for everything. So they had a more relationship of equals, people who wanted to operate together. And that is why they have a good relationship today. in my opinion. So as a result, after all these decades, the two militaries are not really very good at operating together. There's no joint headquarters. There never has been in Japan. At best, they've operated in isolation. Do they recognize they don't have a joint access? Oh, they know. The Japanese military knows this. And US Indo -PACOM has not pushed the issue. And then you had... The State Department side, on the civilian side, people saying, well, if we ask the Japanese to get better at defense matters, well, they'll get angry. And if they do, then the Chinese will be mad. So you have the U .S. on the U .S. side. We're thinking of at least 10 reasons why Japan cannot improve its defenses. That's changed enough in recent years. But you see how many decades we've lost. 00:08:51 JACK GAINES Right. I can see part of what the State Department is saying in that a lot of those countries along the Asian coast were under Japanese rule during World War II. They're concerned that by showing favor and coordinating with them in defense might offend places like the Philippines or Korea. It is a concern to be weighed, but I don't know how much weight you would put to it. 00:09:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I wouldn't give it hardly any. With the Japanese, when you actually think about it, I would say within... 30 years of the end of the war, but certainly today, and for the last at least 20 years ago. The new century. Even before that. The Japanese and World War II is not really an issue in almost all of Asia. The Chinese, of course... Play it up. That's a good way to put it. Of course, they do remember what the Japanese did, and it was barbaric. Although the Chinese Communist Party afterwards killed 50 million Chinese in peacetime and good weather, which the Imperial Japanese Army couldn't have dreamed of doing. But World War II is an issue in China. Korea as well, the relationship is dicey. Up to a point. I mean, little old ladies go and sit in front of the embassy still. 00:10:05 JACK GAINES the embassy still. 00:10:06 GRANT NEWSHAM There are, and then you just had a South Korean amphibious ship come to Yokosuka in Tokyo on a visit. In Korea, there's a fundamental sort of suspicion of the Japanese. Sometimes it is a real dislike. But most people, it's not a big issue. But except for those two countries, you go down the list in Asia, and there is no after effect of World War II. I find the Filipinos get along very well with the Japanese. The Indonesians do. They, in fact, see the Japanese as being the people who freed them from the colonial yoke. Okay. The Malays, they actually didn't have that bad a time during the occupation. The Chinese in Malaysia did. So the Malaysians don't have any really hard feelings against the Japanese. Taiwan, same thing. They've got a very good relationship. And then there's one plus billion Indians who actually have an excellent relationship with Japan and see Japan as real friends and vice versa. So you're starting to get a good chunk of Asia, which, as you can see, actually sees Japan as a good country, useful economically. It's been very generous. And they like to see a Japanese military that's strong enough, allied with the United States, able to deal with China. 00:11:27 JACK GAINES Right. And why would we have such a different balance as we do with Germany and Europe? Because no one's questioning this in Holland or in France. That's just another country. They freely trade, they freely access each other. So maybe mindset just needs to shift to say the reform of Japan is just like Germany, and we need to start treating them and partner nations the same and start advocating for a joint staff. 00:11:52 GRANT NEWSHAM And you could do that in an afternoon, but the Japanese will not speak up for themselves. And an old New York Times reporter, Richard Halloran, I remember him telling me once that all the people he ever dealt with in the world... The Japanese were the worst at explaining themselves. And there's a reticence which slows them down. But also the Americans are afraid to tell them what we need. And that is a huge problem, because if we don't tell them, the Japanese are not blind readers, and they won't do what we think we'd like them to do, but we're afraid to ask. And in fact, one of the Japanese prime ministers in 1970, so 50 -some years ago, He gave some very good advice to the Americans, and it was at the time the Americans were trying to put an aircraft carrier into Yokosuka, the naval base near Tokyo. They wanted to assign it there permanently. And the U .S. side was thinking of excuses why it was too hard for the Japanese. They'll cause political difficulties. The Japanese have an election coming up. The timing just isn't right. And finally, the Japanese side sent a message to the Americans saying, tell us what you need. And don't back down. And they said it out of exasperation, really. And it was the best advice the Americans have ever been given. And we've refused to follow it ever since then. And really, it's almost a cultural trait, sort of a Confucian system. They actually are happy to have experts tell them what they ought to do. Sure. Whereas we are more of the Socratic method. And it doesn't, it just doesn't work. That's why after all these years, the Americans and the Japanese forces, except for the navies, And except for missile defense, we really don't operate together anywhere near where we need to be. We're not even close. And another very interesting fact a lot of people don't know is the Japanese military missed its recruitment targets by about 50 % last year. 5 -0? 00:13:50 JACK GAINES -0? 00:13:50 GRANT NEWSHAM 5 -0. And it routinely misses them by 20 -25%. So this, you can see, is a problem. It's now an older force, doesn't have enough people. In order to fulfill its missions, it would probably have to be twice as big, both personnel -wise and in terms of ships and hardware. Its war stocks are basically non -existent, doesn't know anything really about casualty care, combat casualty replacements, logistics. 00:14:20 JACK GAINES Well, if the media looks down on it and the political class looks down on it, it's not going to get a lot of positivity in the public mindset. So that's got to be part of it. It's not a vote -getter to push for a strong defense. 00:14:31 GRANT NEWSHAM vote -getter to push for a strong defense. I mean, if you're a politician, no one's going to say, he's the defense guy, let's give him our vote. But people vote for other reasons. But you do get used to, after that horrific experience in World War II, that for decades people didn't want to really think about defense, and they were glad to have the Americans around to handle it, and particularly when it seemed like there wasn't any real threat anywhere. People were happy with that, and even the U .S. side. didn't mind it as well. But I'd say it should have started to change at least 20 years ago. And it didn't until maybe four or five years ago. Well, 00:15:10 JACK GAINES when did the risk indicators really start popping up with China? 00:15:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I think by... It can't be back when Nixon went. 00:15:15 JACK GAINES It can't be back when Nixon went. Well, it should have, 00:15:16 GRANT NEWSHAM it should have, you know, I think. But about 2005 is when it was obvious what was coming. 00:15:19 JACK GAINES But about 00:15:21 GRANT NEWSHAM when it was obvious what was coming. And even before that, if you knew what to look for. But as I said, some of us... We knew what needed done and what the problems were. And there were Japanese who did too. And that's why when we put together their amphibious force, it was sort of an effort to address the shortcomings in Japan's self -defense force. Also to improve the overall U .S.-Japan relationship because it was so imbalanced. Right. Where the Japanese weren't doing anything near enough to defend themselves. And that over time creates a lot of friction in a relationship. So we were trying to address that with the amphibious force, and that was 2011, which we were pretty successful at that because we didn't ask permission from anybody. I was going to say, if you were successful, 00:16:10 JACK GAINES did you get fired? 00:16:11 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, it's not that people didn't try. 00:16:11 JACK GAINES Well, it's not that people didn't try. Sorry, that was sarcastic. But I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. 00:16:15 GRANT NEWSHAM I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. Yeah. And didn't quite know what we were doing. And also you had people like General Gregson, who was then at... Department of Defense, who had been in Japan many years, and he knew the importance of it all. So he would provide some cover. But the real success there was because the Japanese side took the ideas and ran with it. And the Americans provided some cover and some know -how and some advice. But it was the Japanese who did that. Once the Japanese took on the mission, well, what are the Americans going to say? But I was even told that at Indo -PACOM, that there were people who gotten wind of this and were very much opposed because the idea that Japanese having an amphibious force was provocative. Not just provocative, but it was going to cause the Japanese to go on the rampage again, like in 1941. I'm not making this up. 00:17:11 JACK GAINES So when Germany starts building the Leopard 2, were they expected to go on a rampage too? 00:17:17 GRANT NEWSHAM No, those are Europeans. Oh, okay. You know how the Europeans are okay. 00:17:19 JACK GAINES okay. You know 00:17:21 GRANT NEWSHAM But the fact that Germans have been allowed back into polite society. tells you something, and the Japanese are just as deserving of it as well. 00:17:30 JACK GAINES Did you see the movie Godzilla Minus One? No. It's an interesting portrayal of post -World War II Japan. And Godzilla, which is this giant monster, comes out of the sea, tears up Japan, and has an atomic breath that shoots off nuclear explosions, which sounds a lot like the United States in a mythological way. One thing that... the show did that was interesting is it kind of engaged post -military era and had talked about it. And it seemed like it was trying to reconcile the past with now and build out a notion that the military is okay, that after the war, there were good things that happened and that we should embrace a military in the future. So there might be some societal impulses out there that are promoting and supporting a more built -up military in Japan. 00:18:24 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, you're actually right. The public at large has always been pretty supportive of the military. For example, when they have open base days, when they put on so -called firepower demonstrations, which is like an exercise you can watch where they shoot off stuff, that they're always oversubscribed. And people just pour into these things because they're interested. And the central government, or say the ruling class, are the ones who are gun -shy or... I'm really hesitant, but the public at large, you know, when you ask them, you know, should Japan have a normal military? The replies to that are like 85%. Well, yes, of course. And I think they would be horrified if they knew the actual state of the Japanese military. I mentioned this to a Japanese politician last year, and he was horrified at the idea. And the public as well would have a similar reaction. Regular Japanese people say they have a pretty good understanding of what Japan needs to do to defend itself and of the importance of having a national defense, but the government doesn't explain it very well. When they do, the reaction, there's a Japanese expression, it's called like, it's atarimae. And it means like, well, yeah. It's like, duh. 00:19:42 JACK GAINES Abnautually. And that's what it means. 00:19:42 GRANT NEWSHAM And that's what it means. Should Japan have a good defense? Atarimae. And yeah, what's the question here? But if you ask that question in the political world, then you'll get all sorts of emming and hawing. They wanted nothing of that. By the late 70s, certainly by the 90s, that they sort of outlived that. But it was comfortable to continue with it, particularly if you're the government, because you don't have to spend money on defense. And the Americans are covering that. So it was as if the Americans were giving. I'd say at least $50 billion a year in free defense coverage, at least, probably more. And, you know, if you're a government, you think, well, why should we do anything different? And so they got used to that. We got used to it. And then at some point, the friction builds up where you just can't do that. And the Japanese themselves start to be resentful. 00:20:37 JACK GAINES Right. Keeping them handicapped, probably. 00:20:40 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. You know, they're not letting us be self -fulfilled. I think that's sort of the marriage counselor's analysis. And so that imbalance was such that it was creating huge problems in the relationship. But the defense relationship, you know, pointing out, well, you know, you guys really aren't very good, except for the Navy. You know, and we can't work with you very well, except for the Navies. And as a result, that's why we are where we are today. By now, if we had a more sort of capable U .S.-Japan defense relationship, where the two services could... operate together, and we're conducting a joint defense of Japan and the surrounding areas, which includes, say, to Taiwan even, that that would have, I think, deterred a lot of the problems that we're having. But by pretending everything was okay, we've gotten ourselves in a position where we now face a real threat out there. And we're trying to make up for lost time. And I don't know. And I don't know which side I would bet on. I'd bet on ours because I'm an American. But that's how out of whack it has gotten. It used to be maybe till 20 years ago, we were in pretty good shape. But you can see that advantage eroding. And nowadays, depending on how a fight were to take place, if it does take place, it would be less of a sure thing than it once was. And that's, I think, putting it very nicely. 00:22:04 JACK GAINES Well, tell me about the threat. 00:22:05 GRANT NEWSHAM What are you seeing? It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. (Part II) 00:00:02 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired Marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japanese defense forces and the PRC threat. This is the second in a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 SPEAKER_02 It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. They built up a military which is just gradually but steadily expanding its reach and its coverage. And it is compared to, say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 290. 00:00:58 JACK GAINES the Chinese Communist Party. 00:01:06 JACK GAINES its reach 00:01:11 JACK GAINES say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit 00:01:15 GRANT NEWSHAM off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just 00:01:25 JACK GAINES like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 00:01:37 SPEAKER_02 Well, fortunately, in terms of quality, they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. Whenever U .S. ships go in there, and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. So if the Chinese pick their spot, 00:01:39 JACK GAINES they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. 00:02:00 JACK GAINES and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. 00:02:16 SPEAKER_02 if the Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. And he's got eight seconds to figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. And yes, we can go in there. But once we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's harder for them, but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are building a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, they are our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't be defeated. An adversary that could give us a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended until about 2017 that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for their... 00:02:16 JACK GAINES if the 00:02:17 SPEAKER_03 Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 00:02:28 JACK GAINES figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. 00:02:39 JACK GAINES we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's 00:02:45 SPEAKER_03 but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are 00:02:55 JACK GAINES a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, 00:03:03 JACK GAINES our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't 00:03:22 JACK GAINES a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended 00:03:50 SPEAKER_03 until about 2017 00:03:51 GRANT NEWSHAM that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, 00:04:01 JACK GAINES who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for 00:04:30 SPEAKER_02 The idea is if you have a powerful military, well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when you can intimidate people. You can dominate them. And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. So they reverse engineer. 00:04:32 SPEAKER_03 well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when 00:04:39 JACK GAINES And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. 00:05:09 SPEAKER_02 Well, it... You know, it's kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact they may not be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing ovations last November in San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which point the Japanese Navy would be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused to. We refused to. 00:05:11 GRANT NEWSHAM kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact 00:05:20 SPEAKER_03 be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just 00:05:23 JACK GAINES has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing 00:05:45 JACK GAINES San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You 00:05:53 SPEAKER_03 would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which 00:06:03 JACK GAINES point the 00:06:06 JACK GAINES be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused 00:07:18 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, as he described it well. Ultimately, the military part of the fight is extremely important. But it's almost a sideshow. But it's almost a sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. And this was done intentionally. In large part, Chinese economic warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at the Americans. Because it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. I don't know. 00:07:20 SPEAKER_03 Ultimately, the military part of the 00:07:26 SPEAKER_03 it's almost a sideshow. 00:07:29 JACK GAINES sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. 00:08:26 JACK GAINES warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. 00:08:34 SPEAKER_03 Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at 00:08:47 GRANT NEWSHAM it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. 00:08:55 GRANT NEWSHAM know. It's been a while. I don't know. It's been a while. 00:09:02 SPEAKER_02 Unfortunately, Copperfish is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them a little longer, but they will popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to convince ourselves that we've been able to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. And as a result, 00:09:03 GRANT NEWSHAM is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them 00:09:07 SPEAKER_03 but they will 00:09:09 GRANT NEWSHAM popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, 00:09:16 JACK GAINES their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? 00:09:49 SPEAKER_03 America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to 00:10:00 JACK GAINES that we've been able 00:10:00 SPEAKER_03 to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. 00:10:10 JACK GAINES Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. 00:10:27 SPEAKER_03 Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. 00:10:34 SPEAKER_02 as a result, they have been able to improve their position politically, psychologically, economically, and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:36 SPEAKER_03 their position 00:10:40 GRANT NEWSHAM and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:51 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, that's the idea. Is you don't want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. Yes, it's not showing up off of San Diego just yet. But places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more of a Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have done this other sort of warfare. 00:10:53 JACK GAINES want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that 00:11:19 SPEAKER_03 sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. 00:11:28 JACK GAINES Yes, it's not showing 00:11:33 JACK GAINES places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more 00:11:46 JACK GAINES Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have 00:11:52 SPEAKER_03 this other 00:12:31 SPEAKER_02 That's exactly what it is. It's mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the word cognitive warfare. You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:33 JACK GAINES mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the 00:12:42 JACK GAINES You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than 00:12:50 GRANT NEWSHAM the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:59 SPEAKER_02 We can't even get that done. 00:13:03 SPEAKER_02 Look, 72 hours, if that for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which is using our own legal system. And the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have been just with that. 00:13:04 JACK GAINES for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which 00:13:13 JACK GAINES the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have 00:13:41 SPEAKER_02 Uh -huh. Uh -huh. 00:13:46 SPEAKER_02 Well, you're right about the Russians, but the Chinese understand that the term gray zone paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working something out. 00:13:51 GRANT NEWSHAM paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working 00:14:03 SPEAKER_03 something out. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_02 That has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that we have to have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into China's behavior, its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and go on the rides. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_03 has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that 00:14:14 JACK GAINES have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons 00:14:22 JACK GAINES climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into 00:14:42 JACK GAINES its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and 00:15:06 SPEAKER_02 That's it. Nobody wants it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most of them have wealth overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this is illegal. And this is illegal. 00:15:08 JACK GAINES it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most 00:15:19 GRANT NEWSHAM overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this 00:15:31 SPEAKER_02 And this is where that really scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. This bothered them. 00:15:33 JACK GAINES scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New 00:15:37 SPEAKER_03 York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. 00:15:46 GRANT NEWSHAM I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. 00:15:53 SPEAKER_02 More than anything else we've ever done. That's... 00:15:53 GRANT NEWSHAM than anything 00:16:14 SPEAKER_02 One way to do it. Another way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:16 JACK GAINES way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to 00:16:19 SPEAKER_03 release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:25 SPEAKER_02 Which of the top 50 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. And that is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen absorb any amount of punishment. And they even talk about it. 00:16:27 SPEAKER_03 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it 00:16:29 GRANT NEWSHAM reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. 00:16:38 JACK GAINES is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen 00:16:49 JACK GAINES they even talk about it. 00:16:51 SPEAKER_02 But when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:16:51 JACK GAINES when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:17:14 SPEAKER_02 But expose that. They can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think 00:17:15 JACK GAINES can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists 00:17:44 SPEAKER_03 get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which 00:17:52 SPEAKER_02 is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It gives them something to work with. It gives them something to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, administrations. And get rid of them and replace them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where people like to be cheaters. Where people like to be cheaters. Where they like their leaders to be corrupt. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you get local reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some problems. But they have played their hand very well today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it gets. 00:17:52 SPEAKER_03 is the thing that makes it 00:17:54 JACK GAINES corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It 00:18:16 JACK GAINES to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, 00:18:23 JACK GAINES them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where 00:18:32 JACK GAINES I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you 00:18:46 GRANT NEWSHAM reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. 00:18:56 JACK GAINES Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some 00:19:12 JACK GAINES today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it 00:19:28 SPEAKER_02 In regards to U .S. policy, in policy, there really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to effectively safeguard what you call freedom consensual government. Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't fight on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not more, than the military. 00:19:30 SPEAKER_03 in policy, there 00:19:31 JACK GAINES really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to 00:19:45 JACK GAINES Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic 00:20:09 GRANT NEWSHAM one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't 00:20:19 JACK GAINES on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, 00:20:30 GRANT NEWSHAM we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not 00:20:40 JACK GAINES more, than the 00:20:45 SPEAKER_02 They have a role to play if they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure out the motivations for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? And this is where you can really make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:20:47 JACK GAINES they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not 00:20:59 SPEAKER_03 so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's 00:21:10 GRANT NEWSHAM make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it 00:21:20 JACK GAINES is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. 00:21:50 SPEAKER_03 Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure 00:22:00 JACK GAINES for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? 00:22:10 JACK GAINES make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, 00:22:32 GRANT NEWSHAM that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:22:39 SPEAKER_02 Asia would turn red overnight, as every country tried to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, 00:22:39 GRANT NEWSHAM would turn red overnight, as every country tried 00:22:42 SPEAKER_03 to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere 00:22:46 JACK GAINES on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend 00:22:51 GRANT NEWSHAM Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, even? Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. 00:23:02 SPEAKER_02 Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? build up the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some effort. 00:23:11 JACK GAINES give them a free trade agreement to 00:23:16 JACK GAINES point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? 00:23:35 JACK GAINES the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some 00:24:25 SPEAKER_02 I think you're right. And it's essential that we start to understand. You look at much of the debate about us in China. What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. Out back. But think of all the things that go into whether or not the two hoodlums. There's all sorts of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:27 JACK GAINES essential that we start to understand. 00:24:32 JACK GAINES us in China. 00:24:33 SPEAKER_03 What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle 00:24:43 JACK GAINES House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see 00:24:52 JACK GAINES whether or not the two hoodlums. 00:24:56 JACK GAINES of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:59 SPEAKER_02 Or that will affect the outcome, actually. None of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. It's only one part of the battle. It's only one part of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:02 JACK GAINES of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's 00:25:21 JACK GAINES of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:22 SPEAKER_02 And if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:22 JACK GAINES if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:45 SPEAKER_02 We talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? They won't let us operate. 00:25:45 JACK GAINES talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? 00:25:53 GRANT NEWSHAM They won't let us operate. 00:25:55 SPEAKER_02 They won't let us operate. Oh, that's a pretty good example. Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other one can. So we've really got to start thinking about these things from a much broader perspective. And it's unfortunate that we're reinventing the wheel here. But the game's not over. It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:25:58 JACK GAINES Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other 00:26:08 JACK GAINES thinking about these things from a much 00:26:15 JACK GAINES the wheel here. 00:26:18 JACK GAINES It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:26:35 SPEAKER_02 Glad to be here. Thank you. Glad to be here. Thank you. 00:26:40 JACK GAINES Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at [email protected]. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.
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  • 207: Grant Newsham on the Japan Defense Force and PRC threat (Part I)
    Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat.  This is a two-part episode. Grant's biography: https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/author/grant-newsham/ Book link: https://www.regnery.com/9781684513659/when-china-attacks/ A recent article: https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/the-us-in-the-pacific-getting-the?utm_source=substack&publication_id=746580&post_id=151553726&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&utm_campaign=email-share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true&r=ercjf&triedRedirect=true --- One CA is a product of the civil affairs association  and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership. We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.  To contact the show, email us at [email protected]  or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org --- Special thanks to the site Cool Jazz Hot Bossa for the sample of Cool Jazz Hot Bossa. (59:00). Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdWUj2NYDYQ --- Transcript: (Part I) 00:00:05 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome Grant Newsham, retired Marine Colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japan Defense Forces and the PRC threat. This is the first of a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 GRANT NEWSHAM I was effectively MarforPak's guy in Asia for a number of years. which worked well in both directions. So I was obviously in Japan, but also did a lot of work for them throughout the region, Southeast Asia as well, Taiwan even, which was a lot of fun. 00:01:13 JACK GAINES Yeah. And you've become a foreign policy advocate in the area. 00:01:16 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. At some point, maybe seven or eight years ago, figured I'd actually done enough stuff to maybe have a few ideas. So I started writing and speak a lot as well. So I guess I'm part of the commentariat. But I seem to write about once a week some topic related to often Asian defense, but sometimes economics, politics, sometimes organized crime. And I do get invited to speak here and there and seem to get a number of television or radio interviews as well. That's really cool. I didn't say I get invited to good things, but I do get the occasional invitation. I used to think it was because I had such insight. Someone told me not all that long ago that actually, if you'll say yes to an interview, you're likely to get more of them. Because the people who book them, they just want to get somebody on. And I thought it was because of my particular wisdom. 00:02:07 JACK GAINES of my particular wisdom. 00:02:09 GRANT NEWSHAM I'm joking a little bit. But obviously, you must have something useful to say. But it is funny. There's one place in Singapore that calls me a lot. It's like their CNN. And they've been calling me. Probably eight years at least, or almost every time, I'll tell the presenters that basically they don't know what they're talking about. And I always think, well, this is the last one, but they keep calling me up. They mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:34 JACK GAINES mislike you because you're the contrarian. 00:02:36 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, I can blame things in a way that sort of suits broadcast and that sort of regular people can understand, you know, 00:02:42 GRANT NEWSHAM that sort of regular people can understand, you know, being a regular person myself. 00:02:47 JACK GAINES Yeah, you learn to disagree without offending. 00:02:49 GRANT NEWSHAM Usually. And it's always sort of a relief, actually, when you can have a different look at things. 00:02:56 JACK GAINES That's good. I always thought you were going to say it is a relief sometimes when you just peel the coat off and then yell at them. 00:03:02 GRANT NEWSHAM The facts speak for themselves. Right. And if it's a presenter, their role is different, and they will generally not have the substantive knowledge that most of the people on the show will have. Right. And so much of what I have to say is often not... in line with accepted wisdom, particularly when it comes to Japan. Sure. So it's often that I'll have to present a different take on things, but they don't seem to be offended. 00:03:27 JACK GAINES Right. You mostly talk about Japan in its current defense fashion or in its foreign policy actions. 00:03:33 GRANT NEWSHAM A lot of that because people have a perception of Japan, for example, as a pacifist country. It cannot fight. It's peace loving. Right. etc. They have a nuclear allergy. You know, just the idea of nuclear weapons in Japan is out of the question. You often hear, well, their constitution won't let them fight. And none of those things are actually true. But it's the received wisdom. It's what people think. And when you simply point out the realities of Japan, that ultimately, at the end of the day, it's a country just like every other. And that the stereotypes about it really aren't correct when it comes to defense security. In fact, they use that the Constitution won't let them have a military. You probably heard it. Yeah. That's the idea. And they don't even call it a military. But the fact is they've got a military, which, according to some ratings, is the fifth most powerful in the world. It depends on how you calculate it, of course. But they call it something else. And what is the actual distinction between offensive and defensive weapons? 00:04:35 JACK GAINES It's usually the strike space. If it's inside your own country defending, then it's a defense space. Once you go out and start taking out other people's cities and moving forces in. 00:04:44 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, for example, they don't have much what you call power projection capability very far off their borders. But they do have a submarine fleet, say over 20 submarines. There's no reason you couldn't send them to the coast of China and start sinking ships. 00:04:59 JACK GAINES True. 00:05:00 GRANT NEWSHAM They've got F -16s. You can put long -range missiles on them and you can fly out of ways and cause people a lot of trouble. But their military really, I would say, is not so good at offense. It's not so good at defense either. And that's something that comes as a surprise to a lot of people. 00:05:15 JACK GAINES Well, do they exercise defense and offense? 00:05:18 GRANT NEWSHAM Oh, they have exercises, training, and they put on a pretty good show, particularly when they have visitors come. But they really, until very recently, and even now, they can't do joint operations, which means the air, sea, and ground forces. can't operate together. In fact, they don't even have a radio with which they can communicate easily. They have to jury -rig some relations, these connections. And that's something most people don't understand, because you look at it on paper. Japan has 250 ,000 people in its military, and it's got ships, aircraft, all of it modern and good stuff. 150 ,000 people in its ground self -defense force, their army. But it's not even the sum of its whole. If you imagine each of your limbs, your arms and your legs, each doing whatever it wants without the coordinating function provided by a brain. 00:06:10 JACK GAINES Sounds like me dancing. 00:06:12 GRANT NEWSHAM It would be, yeah. I think that I can picture that, whereas I'm more of an Arthur Murray kind of guy. But it's like that. And nobody can believe that because they think, well, this is the Japanese. It's this advanced modern country, big military, the rich country. And I mean, they can't even do these simple things. Right. The short answer is no, except in some limited circumstances. After 60 years of the U .S.-Japan defense relationship, 80 years after World War II, they still cannot do some of the basic things that a military needs to do, or do them very well, put it that way. But they do train, they exercise, the personnel quality is excellent. You know, we tend to say, well, we've got Japan as our ally, Japan has a military. But the reality is that the U .S. and Japanese forces cannot work very well together. There's one exception, and that's the two navies. The U .S. Navy and the Japanese Navy, called the Maritime Self -Defense Force, they actually do work well. And they show what's doable. 00:07:15 JACK GAINES They probably do dynamic exercises as well as structured ones, so they have to change, have to practice new orders and maneuvers. 00:07:22 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, the nature of naval operations is you can go out... into the sea, and you have more freedom to actually do stuff. But part of it actually was when Admiral Arleigh Burke, who was later chief of naval operations for many years, he was in charge in Japan. He basically laid down the ground rules, which was that the American Navy was going to treat the Japanese like friends, like allies. And that set the tone for everything. So they had a more relationship of equals, people who wanted to operate together. And that is why they have a good relationship today. in my opinion. So as a result, after all these decades, the two militaries are not really very good at operating together. There's no joint headquarters. There never has been in Japan. At best, they've operated in isolation. Do they recognize they don't have a joint access? Oh, they know. The Japanese military knows this. And US Indo -PACOM has not pushed the issue. And then you had... The State Department side, on the civilian side, people saying, well, if we ask the Japanese to get better at defense matters, well, they'll get angry. And if they do, then the Chinese will be mad. So you have the U .S. on the U .S. side. We're thinking of at least 10 reasons why Japan cannot improve its defenses. That's changed enough in recent years. But you see how many decades we've lost. 00:08:51 JACK GAINES Right. I can see part of what the State Department is saying in that a lot of those countries along the Asian coast were under Japanese rule during World War II. They're concerned that by showing favor and coordinating with them in defense might offend places like the Philippines or Korea. It is a concern to be weighed, but I don't know how much weight you would put to it. 00:09:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I wouldn't give it hardly any. With the Japanese, when you actually think about it, I would say within... 30 years of the end of the war, but certainly today, and for the last at least 20 years ago. The new century. Even before that. The Japanese and World War II is not really an issue in almost all of Asia. The Chinese, of course... Play it up. That's a good way to put it. Of course, they do remember what the Japanese did, and it was barbaric. Although the Chinese Communist Party afterwards killed 50 million Chinese in peacetime and good weather, which the Imperial Japanese Army couldn't have dreamed of doing. But World War II is an issue in China. Korea as well, the relationship is dicey. Up to a point. I mean, little old ladies go and sit in front of the embassy still. 00:10:05 JACK GAINES the embassy still. 00:10:06 GRANT NEWSHAM There are, and then you just had a South Korean amphibious ship come to Yokosuka in Tokyo on a visit. In Korea, there's a fundamental sort of suspicion of the Japanese. Sometimes it is a real dislike. But most people, it's not a big issue. But except for those two countries, you go down the list in Asia, and there is no after effect of World War II. I find the Filipinos get along very well with the Japanese. The Indonesians do. They, in fact, see the Japanese as being the people who freed them from the colonial yoke. Okay. The Malays, they actually didn't have that bad a time during the occupation. The Chinese in Malaysia did. So the Malaysians don't have any really hard feelings against the Japanese. Taiwan, same thing. They've got a very good relationship. And then there's one plus billion Indians who actually have an excellent relationship with Japan and see Japan as real friends and vice versa. So you're starting to get a good chunk of Asia, which, as you can see, actually sees Japan as a good country, useful economically. It's been very generous. And they like to see a Japanese military that's strong enough, allied with the United States, able to deal with China. 00:11:27 JACK GAINES Right. And why would we have such a different balance as we do with Germany and Europe? Because no one's questioning this in Holland or in France. That's just another country. They freely trade, they freely access each other. So maybe mindset just needs to shift to say the reform of Japan is just like Germany, and we need to start treating them and partner nations the same and start advocating for a joint staff. 00:11:52 GRANT NEWSHAM And you could do that in an afternoon, but the Japanese will not speak up for themselves. And an old New York Times reporter, Richard Halloran, I remember him telling me once that all the people he ever dealt with in the world... The Japanese were the worst at explaining themselves. And there's a reticence which slows them down. But also the Americans are afraid to tell them what we need. And that is a huge problem, because if we don't tell them, the Japanese are not blind readers, and they won't do what we think we'd like them to do, but we're afraid to ask. And in fact, one of the Japanese prime ministers in 1970, so 50 -some years ago, He gave some very good advice to the Americans, and it was at the time the Americans were trying to put an aircraft carrier into Yokosuka, the naval base near Tokyo. They wanted to assign it there permanently. And the U .S. side was thinking of excuses why it was too hard for the Japanese. They'll cause political difficulties. The Japanese have an election coming up. The timing just isn't right. And finally, the Japanese side sent a message to the Americans saying, tell us what you need. And don't back down. And they said it out of exasperation, really. And it was the best advice the Americans have ever been given. And we've refused to follow it ever since then. And really, it's almost a cultural trait, sort of a Confucian system. They actually are happy to have experts tell them what they ought to do. Sure. Whereas we are more of the Socratic method. And it doesn't, it just doesn't work. That's why after all these years, the Americans and the Japanese forces, except for the navies, And except for missile defense, we really don't operate together anywhere near where we need to be. We're not even close. And another very interesting fact a lot of people don't know is the Japanese military missed its recruitment targets by about 50 % last year. 5 -0? 00:13:50 JACK GAINES -0? 00:13:50 GRANT NEWSHAM 5 -0. And it routinely misses them by 20 -25%. So this, you can see, is a problem. It's now an older force, doesn't have enough people. In order to fulfill its missions, it would probably have to be twice as big, both personnel -wise and in terms of ships and hardware. Its war stocks are basically non -existent, doesn't know anything really about casualty care, combat casualty replacements, logistics. 00:14:20 JACK GAINES Well, if the media looks down on it and the political class looks down on it, it's not going to get a lot of positivity in the public mindset. So that's got to be part of it. It's not a vote -getter to push for a strong defense. 00:14:31 GRANT NEWSHAM vote -getter to push for a strong defense. I mean, if you're a politician, no one's going to say, he's the defense guy, let's give him our vote. But people vote for other reasons. But you do get used to, after that horrific experience in World War II, that for decades people didn't want to really think about defense, and they were glad to have the Americans around to handle it, and particularly when it seemed like there wasn't any real threat anywhere. People were happy with that, and even the U .S. side. didn't mind it as well. But I'd say it should have started to change at least 20 years ago. And it didn't until maybe four or five years ago. Well, 00:15:10 JACK GAINES when did the risk indicators really start popping up with China? 00:15:14 GRANT NEWSHAM I think by... It can't be back when Nixon went. 00:15:15 JACK GAINES It can't be back when Nixon went. Well, it should have, 00:15:16 GRANT NEWSHAM it should have, you know, I think. But about 2005 is when it was obvious what was coming. 00:15:19 JACK GAINES But about 00:15:21 GRANT NEWSHAM when it was obvious what was coming. And even before that, if you knew what to look for. But as I said, some of us... We knew what needed done and what the problems were. And there were Japanese who did too. And that's why when we put together their amphibious force, it was sort of an effort to address the shortcomings in Japan's self -defense force. Also to improve the overall U .S.-Japan relationship because it was so imbalanced. Right. Where the Japanese weren't doing anything near enough to defend themselves. And that over time creates a lot of friction in a relationship. So we were trying to address that with the amphibious force, and that was 2011, which we were pretty successful at that because we didn't ask permission from anybody. I was going to say, if you were successful, 00:16:10 JACK GAINES did you get fired? 00:16:11 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, it's not that people didn't try. 00:16:11 JACK GAINES Well, it's not that people didn't try. Sorry, that was sarcastic. But I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. 00:16:15 GRANT NEWSHAM I was a reservist, so they couldn't quite get a bead on me. Yeah. And didn't quite know what we were doing. And also you had people like General Gregson, who was then at... Department of Defense, who had been in Japan many years, and he knew the importance of it all. So he would provide some cover. But the real success there was because the Japanese side took the ideas and ran with it. And the Americans provided some cover and some know -how and some advice. But it was the Japanese who did that. Once the Japanese took on the mission, well, what are the Americans going to say? But I was even told that at Indo -PACOM, that there were people who gotten wind of this and were very much opposed because the idea that Japanese having an amphibious force was provocative. Not just provocative, but it was going to cause the Japanese to go on the rampage again, like in 1941. I'm not making this up. 00:17:11 JACK GAINES So when Germany starts building the Leopard 2, were they expected to go on a rampage too? 00:17:17 GRANT NEWSHAM No, those are Europeans. Oh, okay. You know how the Europeans are okay. 00:17:19 JACK GAINES okay. You know 00:17:21 GRANT NEWSHAM But the fact that Germans have been allowed back into polite society. tells you something, and the Japanese are just as deserving of it as well. 00:17:30 JACK GAINES Did you see the movie Godzilla Minus One? No. It's an interesting portrayal of post -World War II Japan. And Godzilla, which is this giant monster, comes out of the sea, tears up Japan, and has an atomic breath that shoots off nuclear explosions, which sounds a lot like the United States in a mythological way. One thing that... the show did that was interesting is it kind of engaged post -military era and had talked about it. And it seemed like it was trying to reconcile the past with now and build out a notion that the military is okay, that after the war, there were good things that happened and that we should embrace a military in the future. So there might be some societal impulses out there that are promoting and supporting a more built -up military in Japan. 00:18:24 GRANT NEWSHAM Well, you're actually right. The public at large has always been pretty supportive of the military. For example, when they have open base days, when they put on so -called firepower demonstrations, which is like an exercise you can watch where they shoot off stuff, that they're always oversubscribed. And people just pour into these things because they're interested. And the central government, or say the ruling class, are the ones who are gun -shy or... I'm really hesitant, but the public at large, you know, when you ask them, you know, should Japan have a normal military? The replies to that are like 85%. Well, yes, of course. And I think they would be horrified if they knew the actual state of the Japanese military. I mentioned this to a Japanese politician last year, and he was horrified at the idea. And the public as well would have a similar reaction. Regular Japanese people say they have a pretty good understanding of what Japan needs to do to defend itself and of the importance of having a national defense, but the government doesn't explain it very well. When they do, the reaction, there's a Japanese expression, it's called like, it's atarimae. And it means like, well, yeah. It's like, duh. 00:19:42 JACK GAINES Abnautually. And that's what it means. 00:19:42 GRANT NEWSHAM And that's what it means. Should Japan have a good defense? Atarimae. And yeah, what's the question here? But if you ask that question in the political world, then you'll get all sorts of emming and hawing. They wanted nothing of that. By the late 70s, certainly by the 90s, that they sort of outlived that. But it was comfortable to continue with it, particularly if you're the government, because you don't have to spend money on defense. And the Americans are covering that. So it was as if the Americans were giving. I'd say at least $50 billion a year in free defense coverage, at least, probably more. And, you know, if you're a government, you think, well, why should we do anything different? And so they got used to that. We got used to it. And then at some point, the friction builds up where you just can't do that. And the Japanese themselves start to be resentful. 00:20:37 JACK GAINES Right. Keeping them handicapped, probably. 00:20:40 GRANT NEWSHAM Yeah. You know, they're not letting us be self -fulfilled. I think that's sort of the marriage counselor's analysis. And so that imbalance was such that it was creating huge problems in the relationship. But the defense relationship, you know, pointing out, well, you know, you guys really aren't very good, except for the Navy. You know, and we can't work with you very well, except for the Navies. And as a result, that's why we are where we are today. By now, if we had a more sort of capable U .S.-Japan defense relationship, where the two services could... operate together, and we're conducting a joint defense of Japan and the surrounding areas, which includes, say, to Taiwan even, that that would have, I think, deterred a lot of the problems that we're having. But by pretending everything was okay, we've gotten ourselves in a position where we now face a real threat out there. And we're trying to make up for lost time. And I don't know. And I don't know which side I would bet on. I'd bet on ours because I'm an American. But that's how out of whack it has gotten. It used to be maybe till 20 years ago, we were in pretty good shape. But you can see that advantage eroding. And nowadays, depending on how a fight were to take place, if it does take place, it would be less of a sure thing than it once was. And that's, I think, putting it very nicely. 00:22:04 JACK GAINES Well, tell me about the threat. 00:22:05 GRANT NEWSHAM What are you seeing? It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. (Part II) 00:00:02 JACK GAINES Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at [email protected]. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www.civilaffairsassoc.org. I'll have those in the show notes. Please welcome back Grant Newsham, retired Marine colonel and author of When China Attacks, A Warning to America. Grant came on the show to discuss the state of the Japanese defense forces and the PRC threat. This is the second in a two-part episode, so let's get started. 00:00:56 SPEAKER_02 It's China. led by the Chinese Communist Party. They built up a military which is just gradually but steadily expanding its reach and its coverage. And it is compared to, say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 290. 00:00:58 JACK GAINES the Chinese Communist Party. 00:01:06 JACK GAINES its reach 00:01:11 JACK GAINES say, 2020, now instead of just being able to operate a little bit 00:01:15 GRANT NEWSHAM off their coast, they can reach Guam, Hawaii, and onwards. The Chinese military doesn't tend to develop into a force able to operate worldwide just 00:01:25 JACK GAINES like the U .S. can. And their ship numbers. They've got more than we do. Something like 350 versus our 00:01:37 SPEAKER_02 Well, fortunately, in terms of quality, they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. Whenever U .S. ships go in there, and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. So if the Chinese pick their spot, 00:01:39 JACK GAINES they're pretty good. And they know what they need to do, and they're getting better. For some things like carrier operations, they're not at our level yet. But if you look at the speed at which they have developed, they're in pretty good shape. But let's just say the South China Sea, which is one and a half times the size of the Mediterranean. 00:02:00 JACK GAINES and we do publicize our transits and operations and exercises, for every ship we put in there, For every ship we put in, the Chinese can match it with at least 10. And that doesn't include ground -based and air -launched anti -ship missiles, for example. 00:02:16 SPEAKER_02 if the Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. And he's got eight seconds to figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. And yes, we can go in there. But once we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's harder for them, but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are building a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, they are our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't be defeated. An adversary that could give us a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended until about 2017 that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for their... 00:02:16 JACK GAINES if the 00:02:17 SPEAKER_03 Chinese pick their spot, pick their timing, I wouldn't want to be the destroyer skipper who's got 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 20 anti -ship missiles coming at him. 00:02:28 JACK GAINES figure out what to do. The point is they have had de facto control of the South China Sea since about seven, eight years ago. 00:02:39 JACK GAINES we're gone, the Chinese close back up and they've pretty much got it. Beyond that, it's 00:02:45 SPEAKER_03 but they're steadily expanding their capability to conduct operations. It's a military that has its problems, like every military, but they are trying to correct them. They are 00:02:55 JACK GAINES a military which they want to be able to defeat a country that has aircraft carriers, which is us. In many respects, 00:03:03 JACK GAINES our equals. Have you ever heard a Korean War veteran who said he wanted to fight the Chinese again? And these were Chinese. These was the Chinese of 1950s. It's a very different place today. And I'm not saying that they can't be defeated, but I'm not saying that they can't 00:03:22 JACK GAINES a lot of trouble. When their intentions are to first dominate regionally and locally, and then push that farther afield to all the Pacific and beyond. And they're setting up the infrastructure worldwide with ports and airfields to do that. They're investing in long -range transports, these naval replenishment ships that you need to be able to operate the way we do, and that's their mission. And we have pretended 00:03:50 SPEAKER_03 until about 2017 00:03:51 GRANT NEWSHAM that this wasn't the case. In fact, you couldn't even say China was an adversary. And guys who did, like Captain James Fennell, 00:04:01 JACK GAINES who was the head of intelligence at Pack Fleet. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. He was cashier. He was forced to retire. The then administration hated him and got rid of him. And that's how bad it was. And I saw this all firsthand. Experience some of it, not as bad as Captain Fennell did. So we've allowed them to build up into a military that we had better take very seriously. And the Chinese do see this as a tool for 00:04:30 SPEAKER_02 The idea is if you have a powerful military, well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when you can intimidate people. You can dominate them. And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. So they reverse engineer. 00:04:32 SPEAKER_03 well, that's when you can lean on people. That's when 00:04:39 JACK GAINES And they're happy with the psychological domination, political domination. It doesn't have to be occupying, but dominating. And they're in every field, from outer space, long -range missiles, undersea warfare, really putting a lot of effort into it. And there is a certain sort of ingenuity that goes into their operations. Well, they can't invent things. They don't develop things on their own. They just steal things. So they reverse engineer things. 00:05:09 SPEAKER_02 Well, it... You know, it's kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact they may not be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing ovations last November in San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which point the Japanese Navy would be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused to. We refused to. 00:05:11 GRANT NEWSHAM kind of true up to a point, but look at us. The Yankee ingenuity was taking stolen British technology and making it better. And so the fact 00:05:20 SPEAKER_03 be as innovative as us, well, sometimes it just 00:05:23 JACK GAINES has to be good enough. So they've got now a military to combine with this desire for political domination as well as considering their economic power as just as important as the military. And you see how successful that has been. When you have U .S. business leaders giving Xi Jinping two standing 00:05:45 JACK GAINES San Francisco, that tells you how successful they've been on the economic front. And the Japanese know they have a huge problem. You 00:05:53 SPEAKER_03 would often hear the Japanese military saying, one thing Taiwan's defense is Japan's defense. But I've even seen the calculations they did, like at which 00:06:03 JACK GAINES point the 00:06:06 JACK GAINES be outmatched by the Chinese Navy. And they had the date almost down to when it was. And our side, we were late recognizing this. We refused 00:07:18 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, as he described it well. Ultimately, the military part of the fight is extremely important. But it's almost a sideshow. But it's almost a sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. And this was done intentionally. In large part, Chinese economic warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at the Americans. Because it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. I don't know. 00:07:20 SPEAKER_03 Ultimately, the military part of the 00:07:26 SPEAKER_03 it's almost a sideshow. 00:07:29 JACK GAINES sideshow to the other activities, the other fight that China's been waging for the last 30, 40 years, almost ever since we opened up to them. And that has been generally referred to as political warfare, with components being economic warfare, financial warfare, drug warfare, which is the word the Chinese use. So all this fentanyl that's been pumped into America for the last decade that's killed up towards a million Americans, almost all of it comes from China. And they know exactly what they're doing. And so every year they're taking like the equivalent of two or three divisions off the battlefield. You've destroyed neighborhoods. You've destroyed successful economic warfare. Drive 30 miles up the road to Baltimore. Go to Sparrows, Baltimore. Where there used to be steel mills. And now you have Amazon fulfillment sectors at best. But you've seen just the gutting of American society, the so -called working class, the Rust Belt. And this was done intentionally. 00:08:26 JACK GAINES warfare directed at the United States. And then you have cyber warfare as well. You have cyber espionage. 00:08:34 SPEAKER_03 Well beyond what countries normally do. But they have used it very effectively. And the Chinese just... Recently put out their new fighter. That's called the J -35. That is a dig at 00:08:47 GRANT NEWSHAM it is based on stolen blueprints for the F -35. 00:08:55 GRANT NEWSHAM know. It's been a while. I don't know. It's been a while. 00:09:02 SPEAKER_02 Unfortunately, Copperfish is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them a little longer, but they will popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to convince ourselves that we've been able to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. And as a result, 00:09:03 GRANT NEWSHAM is leapfrogging over stages. Yes, it may take them 00:09:07 SPEAKER_03 but they will 00:09:09 GRANT NEWSHAM popscotch through it. And so... So I take it pretty seriously. Their Y -20, 00:09:16 JACK GAINES their long -range transport, is basically the C -17. And they've just been immensely successful at this sort of espionage. And at the same time, we've done nothing to push back on them. Then there's the propaganda angle of this, which really good old Jesuit meaning of the word just means to explain yourself or articulate your position. So people understand that they've been very successful in getting Americans to buy the Chinese line. China's rise is peaceful. China's rise is peaceful. China's never attacked anybody. China's never attacked anybody. It's not true. All great nations do this. So who are we to complain? 00:09:49 SPEAKER_03 America has its problems, too. America has its problems, too. Who are we to complain about the Chinese taking live organs out of Uyghurs and prisoners of conscience? And we've been able to 00:10:00 JACK GAINES that we've been able 00:10:00 SPEAKER_03 to convince ourselves that we've not only can we not do anything, we shouldn't do anything. This is changing. But you can see we were very late getting started. And this has all been done without firing a shot. 00:10:10 JACK GAINES Chinese economic inroads, Chinese economic inroads, which leads to political influence, is in, for example, South America and Africa. Just immense how fast that has come, how solid it is. Pacific Island, something similar is going on, something similar is going on. 00:10:27 SPEAKER_03 Look at the difficulties the Germans have had, weaning themselves off of this Chinese addiction. 00:10:34 SPEAKER_02 as a result, they have been able to improve their position politically, psychologically, economically, and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:36 SPEAKER_03 their position 00:10:40 GRANT NEWSHAM and they've been able to do this globally without having to use their military. 00:10:51 SPEAKER_02 Yeah, that's the idea. Is you don't want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. Yes, it's not showing up off of San Diego just yet. But places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more of a Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have done this other sort of warfare. 00:10:53 JACK GAINES want to. So our view of warfare is like a hundred -yard dash. Wherever the two sides come to the line, shake loose, and then someone fires a gun, and then someone fires a gun, and then it's game on. To the Chinese, the war has started long ago. And you're wearing down your opponent. You're weakening his ability to resist. You're creating chaos in his own country. There's a word called entropy. Which is just breaking down. Entropic warfare is a word that 00:11:19 SPEAKER_03 sometimes gets used. For you're breaking down his ability to resist. And at the same time, of course, the Chinese are building up a military, which is very serious. 00:11:28 JACK GAINES Yes, it's not showing 00:11:33 JACK GAINES places closer to China, it's much more of an issue. Japan knows the problem they have with the People's Liberation Army. Pacific Island, Southeast Asia. You are seeing more 00:11:46 JACK GAINES Chinese presence. And the point is, when the time comes, you may not even be able to resist if the Chinese have 00:11:52 SPEAKER_03 this other 00:12:31 SPEAKER_02 That's exactly what it is. It's mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the word cognitive warfare. You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:33 JACK GAINES mental warfare. You're attacking the mind. You're attacking how people think about things. Some people use the 00:12:42 JACK GAINES You're the popular word. Yeah, you're attacking the mind. And so you can see how well it worked. And the Russians had a much poorer hand to play than 00:12:50 GRANT NEWSHAM the Chinese do. Because we do so much business with China. And you see how hard it is to do things like ban TikTok. We can't even get that done. 00:12:59 SPEAKER_02 We can't even get that done. 00:13:03 SPEAKER_02 Look, 72 hours, if that for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which is using our own legal system. And the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have been just with that. 00:13:04 JACK GAINES for the Indians do, we can do it. And you see how Chinese successfully use what they call lawfare, which 00:13:13 JACK GAINES the idea is that you get proxies, influential foreigners in your target country to actually do your bidding for you. The Chinese have like five aces to play. The Russians might have won, but you can see how successful the Russians have 00:13:41 SPEAKER_02 Uh -huh. Uh -huh. 00:13:46 SPEAKER_02 Well, you're right about the Russians, but the Chinese understand that the term gray zone paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working something out. 00:13:51 GRANT NEWSHAM paralyzes Americans. We have no idea what to do because of our view of warfare being until the shooting starts. That it is we're not really at war. There's still hope of working 00:14:03 SPEAKER_03 something out. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_02 That has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that we have to have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into China's behavior, its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and go on the rides. 00:14:05 SPEAKER_03 has been our rote response for all these years, is to not get the Chinese mad, don't provoke them, and we have convinced ourselves that 00:14:14 JACK GAINES have Chinese help with fill -in -the -blank, North Korea transnational crime, nuclear weapons 00:14:22 JACK GAINES climate change, and therefore we cannot challenge the PRC because we won't get their cooperation. That's what we've effectively handcuffed ourselves, but when it comes to that so -called hybrid warfare, it's not all that It's not all that complicated if you recognize what it is and how it fits into 00:14:42 JACK GAINES its strategy. But you also would do well to attract from other directions where they're particularly vulnerable. And that is where you take advantage of the fact, for example, the Chinese currency is not freely convertible, which means that outside of China, nobody really wants Chinese money. It's like the script at a... It's like the script where you can use it to buy caramel corn and 00:15:06 SPEAKER_02 That's it. Nobody wants it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most of them have wealth overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this is illegal. And this is illegal. 00:15:08 JACK GAINES it. So choke that off and China's got some real problems. Another is the just thoroughgoing corruption of China's ruling class. And most 00:15:19 GRANT NEWSHAM overseas, foreign bank accounts. foreign bank accounts, relatives with green cards, relatives with green cards, some operate businesses overseas. And this 00:15:31 SPEAKER_02 And this is where that really scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. This bothered them. 00:15:33 JACK GAINES scares them. Because in 2011 or 2012, New 00:15:37 SPEAKER_03 York Times and Bloomberg actually put out some good stories about the overseas wealth of China's top people, including Xi Jinping's family. 00:15:46 GRANT NEWSHAM I've never seen a reaction from the Chinese like that one. 00:15:53 SPEAKER_02 More than anything else we've ever done. That's... 00:15:53 GRANT NEWSHAM than anything 00:16:14 SPEAKER_02 One way to do it. Another way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:16 JACK GAINES way to do it. That would be a tactical thing. Say you were to 00:16:19 SPEAKER_03 release, say, every Friday. Say at 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 1 a .m. 1 o 'clock or whenever. 00:16:25 SPEAKER_02 Which of the top 50 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. And that is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen absorb any amount of punishment. And they even talk about it. 00:16:27 SPEAKER_03 Chinese Communist Party officials? And make sure it 00:16:29 GRANT NEWSHAM reached everywhere in China. The thing that the public really hates is this corruption. And by the top dogs. 00:16:38 JACK GAINES is something that really bothers them. And you note that the Chinese leadership is very willing to have the average Chinese citizen 00:16:49 JACK GAINES they even talk about it. 00:16:51 SPEAKER_02 But when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:16:51 JACK GAINES when it's personal, then they see it very differently. And this is one of the few ways to really make it personal for them is to capitalize on this corruption. So when we talk about... Dealing with Gray's own operations, we're probably not going to be all that successful. Because they have more ships, they can be in more places. 00:17:14 SPEAKER_02 But expose that. They can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think 00:17:15 JACK GAINES can do that. Have we made a concerted effort to expose Chinese bribery, the illicit payments, the corruption that they put into everywhere they go? Everywhere there's a Chinese presence, you have corruption of the society, the political class as well. And do we ever target that? Do we consider it a priority effort? I don't even think we consider it an effort at all. Exposure is the one thing that has a huge effect. This is why investigative journalists 00:17:44 SPEAKER_03 get big. It's why like Irish. gangsters try to murder them in Malta they get blown up because they're effective because they're effective which 00:17:52 SPEAKER_02 is the thing that makes it very hard for corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It gives them something to work with. It gives them something to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, administrations. And get rid of them and replace them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where people like to be cheaters. Where people like to be cheaters. Where they like their leaders to be corrupt. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you get local reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some problems. But they have played their hand very well today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it gets. 00:17:52 SPEAKER_03 is the thing that makes it 00:17:54 JACK GAINES corruption to work and that's where I think We have some real opportunities to make it very clear what's being done. And this is something that, if you expose it, you can really capitalize on it. Just make it too hard to do this. And it also gives oxygen to the honest people in a country. It 00:18:16 JACK GAINES to work with. To take on these repressive regimes, these corrupt regimes, these corrupt regimes, 00:18:23 JACK GAINES them with honest people. I've never met anywhere, anywhere I've been. Over the years. Where 00:18:32 JACK GAINES I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. I just haven't met it. I've been anywhere. It's just nothing you can do. But it's just nothing you can do. It really has an effect. And that's where I think government for sources could be effectively devoted. And particularly once you 00:18:46 GRANT NEWSHAM reporters in on it. Once you get the local. Honest locals in on it. Honest locals in on it. And that's where I think we could be very effective. 00:18:56 JACK GAINES Corruption, as you've mentioned, that really is the grease to everything the Chinese communists do globally. Take it away and then take away their access to dollars, convertible currency. And they've really got some 00:19:12 JACK GAINES today. But in some ways it's a house of cards. I don't think it's that hard to take on. But the longer you wait, the harder it 00:19:28 SPEAKER_02 In regards to U .S. policy, in policy, there really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to effectively safeguard what you call freedom consensual government. Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't fight on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not more, than the military. 00:19:30 SPEAKER_03 in policy, there 00:19:31 JACK GAINES really is a... a desire that the United States stays around in Asia, that maintains its military might, and is able to 00:19:45 JACK GAINES Because if you go around the region, nobody wants to be dominated by the PRC. But they do have a huge advantage, particularly economically, that they're seen by leaders and business people in a lot of these countries. That's really the source of... some wealth, some prosperity. And we would do well, for example, to see the fight as just as much an economic 00:20:09 GRANT NEWSHAM one as a military one. Because we could build up our military, rebuild it, and we could have 800 ships in the Navy, and still lose. If we don't 00:20:19 JACK GAINES on these other fronts, we don't want you here because we're doing too much business with China. And that's where the U .S., along with its friends, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Indians, the Australians, 00:20:30 GRANT NEWSHAM we would do well to operate together more and to see the economic front and the political warfare fronts as a priority effort as much, if not 00:20:40 JACK GAINES more, than the 00:20:45 SPEAKER_02 They have a role to play if they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure out the motivations for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? And this is where you can really make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:20:47 JACK GAINES they're properly harnessed. But you do know that these days you don't see the Yankee trader that used to exist. You'd run to Americans everywhere trying to sell something to do business. Not 00:20:59 SPEAKER_03 so much these days. And we've almost ceded the far -flung part to the world. Because, well, the return on investment isn't enough. That's not an attractive enough proposition. Well, then let's 00:21:10 GRANT NEWSHAM make it one. Plus, you do have, say, the Japanese, the Indians, who are much better at operating in these places, to put it together into a coherent plan. Understand what it 00:21:20 JACK GAINES is, political warfare, and not just block the Chinese political warfare effort, but actually have our own campaign. And it really is worth doing some homework, I think, for a lot of people into what political warfare is. One sees the opportunities, but it takes a certain type of person who's good at it. versus a civil affairs guy. Versus a civil affairs guy. He's going to see different... He's going to see parts of the battlefield in a different way. 00:21:50 SPEAKER_03 Yes, sometimes you want the tank. But then there's this other part of it all. That is almost like a liberal arts test. Here you have to figure 00:22:00 JACK GAINES for things. You have to figure out how a society works. And then how do you appeal to it using the things that are parts of political warfare? 00:22:10 JACK GAINES make some mileage. You've got to have both. Make no mistake. If you're not able to destroy things and kill people, the civil affairs part isn't going to get you very far. But combine the two, and then you've really got something that's very hard to take on if you're the bad guys. We talk about defending Taiwan, and how important it is, and it is, I think, indispensable, 00:22:32 GRANT NEWSHAM that China does not take Taiwan and enslave 23 million people. If they did that... 00:22:39 SPEAKER_02 Asia would turn red overnight, as every country tried to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, 00:22:39 GRANT NEWSHAM would turn red overnight, as every country tried 00:22:42 SPEAKER_03 to cut the best deal they could. No country anywhere 00:22:46 JACK GAINES on Earth would have much confidence in American promises that will protect them. But one of the ways to actually defend 00:22:51 GRANT NEWSHAM Taiwan is, yes, they could maybe use F -35s and long -range missiles and smart pines, etc. You do have to have all of this stuff. Is it enough, even? Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. 00:23:02 SPEAKER_02 Particularly if the other side says, okay, we'll absorb whatever you can send at us, but you're finished. But one of the ways that... But one of the ways is to give them a free trade agreement to improve their economy to the point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? build up the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some effort. 00:23:11 JACK GAINES give them a free trade agreement to 00:23:16 JACK GAINES point that the government felt like it had money to spend on defense. You get a certain confidence in the entire society when they're more prosperous. Salaries are very low in Taiwan. Make it so people feel like they've got more money. Can they can buy a house? Can they can buy a condominium? 00:23:35 JACK GAINES the economy and that has a ripple effect throughout the society and on their military itself. And yet we didn't do that. And I think that's where we should apply some 00:24:25 SPEAKER_02 I think you're right. And it's essential that we start to understand. You look at much of the debate about us in China. What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. Out back. But think of all the things that go into whether or not the two hoodlums. There's all sorts of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:27 JACK GAINES essential that we start to understand. 00:24:32 JACK GAINES us in China. 00:24:33 SPEAKER_03 What happens when the two forces go at each other? And that's almost like... Going up behind the Waffle House. Going up behind the Waffle 00:24:43 JACK GAINES House. To see who's the toughest guy in Prince William County. To see 00:24:52 JACK GAINES whether or not the two hoodlums. 00:24:56 JACK GAINES of reasons why. No, there may not. 00:24:59 SPEAKER_02 Or that will affect the outcome, actually. None of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. It's only one part of the battle. It's only one part of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:02 JACK GAINES of them have to do with force on force. And that's so much of our debate on the US -China military problem. Is that a problem? Would our Navy take on theirs? Is there long -range missiles outrange ours? Yes, it's important. Make no mistake. Yes, it's 00:25:21 JACK GAINES of the battle. And it's the last part. 00:25:22 SPEAKER_02 And if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:22 JACK GAINES if you look at the other part, it's a political warfare. And every part of that, then you have the chance, one, not to lose. You can actually shape things to your advantage. But if you don't, and the other guy is the only one playing that, well, you're likely to find yourself at 2 a .m. outside the Waffle House, and he's actually ready. We talk about bases. 00:25:45 SPEAKER_02 We talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? They won't let us operate. 00:25:45 JACK GAINES talk about bases. Well, what if we don't have the access because Chinese political warfare has made us so the locals won't let us into a place? 00:25:53 GRANT NEWSHAM They won't let us operate. 00:25:55 SPEAKER_02 They won't let us operate. Oh, that's a pretty good example. Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other one can. So we've really got to start thinking about these things from a much broader perspective. And it's unfortunate that we're reinventing the wheel here. But the game's not over. It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:25:58 JACK GAINES Is that a pretty good example? One hoodlum can't get a ride to the awful house, but the other 00:26:08 JACK GAINES thinking about these things from a much 00:26:15 JACK GAINES the wheel here. 00:26:18 JACK GAINES It may be the bottom of the 7th and we're down by 6th. We're the old Washington Senators. We're the old Washington Senators. and debate how far we're behind. At the end of the day, we've got a good hand to play. I hope we start playing it. 00:26:35 SPEAKER_02 Glad to be here. Thank you. Glad to be here. Thank you. 00:26:40 JACK GAINES Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field, working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.
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One CA Podcast is here to inspire anyone interested in traveling to work with a partner nation’s people and leadership to forward U.S. foreign policy. ​ We bring in current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences and give recommendations for working the ”last three feet” of foreign relations. The show is sponsored by the Civil Affairs Association.
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